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1INTRODUCTION
Provenance is information about the history, origin, derivation, and context of data.
Provenance management has become critical in various data systems such as database,
workflow, and web systems [29, 46, 99]. For example, all major scientific workflow sys-
tems [122, 133, 114, 48, 44] support provenance. The past few years have witnessed
the much progress on provenance standardization, including OPM [100] and PROV [96],
and active community engagement in the provenance challenge series [2]. Provenance is
useful to interpret analysis of results, to repeat a scientific discovery, and to trace errors in
data. Provenance is also useful to answer data lineage queries and decide the trustworthi-
ness of a data product.
With the advent of internet scale data, the complexity of scientific workflows and en-
suring provenance management systems have grown significantly. Traditional approaches
to provenance queries do not adapt adequately to account for this scale, necessitating
scalable provenance query and data management systems. As science becomes more and
more interdisciplinary and collaborative, the notion of collaborative scientific workflows
has been proposed to address the increasing need of collective data analytics using the
scientific workflow paradigm [90, 125, 132, 131, 55]. In such collaborative environments,
adequate access control policies are necessary to safeguard sensitive information and fa-
cilitate privacy-aware sharing of workflows, data products, and provenance information
among collaborating parties [36].
It has been well recognized that the general provenance security problem is critical for
modern scientific workflow systems [36, 92]. Unauthorized access to provenance might
disclose confidential information about the related data products. The code for collecting,
querying and mining of provenance can be compromised, forged, or replayed by intruders.
The linkages among data products, provenance, and workflow specifications can be sev-
ered or forged in a malicious environment. Compromised provenance can lead to misinter-
pretation of analysis results, unintentional errors, and can compromise the confidentiality
2of related datasets. In this research, we focus on the confidentiality of provenance so that
provenance is accessible only to authorized users. This is important because provenance
often encodes the detailed protocol of a scientific experiment and constitutes the intel-
lectual property of the respective stakeholders. Various access control mechanisms have
been proposed for the protection of the confidentiality of scientific workflow provenance
[36, 92]. This is significantly underscored in workflows that process sensitive health or
financial information.
In contrast to business workflows, which are relatively stable over time, scientific work-
flows tend to evolve rapidly as scientists frequently generate, explore, and test multiple
hypotheses about a scientific problem simultaneously [57]. For example, an existing work-
flow w1 might be extended with additional sub-workflows into workfloww11 to perform the
more advanced scientific analysis. The sub-workflow w11 can be further evolved into w111
and w112 with additional sub-workflows, tasks, and data channels. All these workflows can
be used simultaneously to explore different hypotheses or to perform different but related
scientific analysis. As a result, it is important to evolve the corresponding access control
policies as well. In dealing with such large sets of evolving policies, manually checking the
quality of each policy becomes impractical, and automated analysis algorithms for access
control policies of scientific workflow provenance are necessary to ensure the correctness
and performance of the policy enforcement engine.
One domain, that could benefit from automation, computational power, and data in-
tegrity that comes with scientific workflow, is in therapeutic treatment planning in autism
spectrum disorders. Scientific workflows could seamlessly integrate disparate data sources,
consolidate wisdom of the crowd, and harness the power of machine learning to aid ser-
vice providers with their therapy and service planning. This, however, is a data-intensive
process and requires an underlying provenance system that is flexible and scalable enough
to cater to a deluge of data. Heterogeneity in data collections with disparate and sparse
data sources make composing the workflow challenging and maintaining the provenance
3system complex. In this research, we demonstrate the complexity and scale requirement of
next-generation provenance systems by introducing a scientific workflow that consolidates
heterogeneous data sources to predict efficacy of therapeutic services of autism spectrum
disorder. This big scale data, inherent in such domains, has brought forth a new research
direction.
With autism on the rise and a lack of retrospective study in management and alignment
of behavior intervention and educational plan and how it affects the manifestation of ASD
symptoms, parents, and the community at large are finding it challenging to individualize
forward-looking goals and educational plans for kids with ASD. There is a flurry of anecdo-
tal evidence, parent, caregiver and therapist data, that, if mined retrospectively, can lead to
better understanding of how appropriate goals, given a child’s traits and needs, could po-
tentially mitigate autistic behavior and result in overall improvement. In this work, we aim
to delineate a scientific workflow framework that can be employed to apply data-mining
techniques to improve predictability in the domain of autism spectrum disorder.
In Big data research, the provenance of big data [60, 59, 63, 33, 7] plays a major role.
Big data provenance deals with many research challenges and open issues which need
deep investigation like confidentiality of the data provenance process, secure and privacy-
preserving big data provenance, flexible big data provenance query tools, etc [45]. One of
the platforms used for handling big data provenance is Pig. Pig is a platform for analyzing
large datasets on top of Hadoop, with a rich, multi-valued and nested data model. Pig’s
language, Pig Latin is a comprehensive imperative query language that lets us express data
transformations such as filtering datasets, merge them and apply functions to a groups
of records. It is simple to understand data flow language, yet a fast iterative language
with strong MapReduce compilation engine. Pig Latin gives a level of abstraction from
MapReduce procedural model by providing join and filter like relational style operators
which do not have out-of-the-box analogs in MapReduce framework.
The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized as follows: In Chapter 1,
4we present the core concepts of provenance models along with scalable query and secure
access control policies. In Chapter 2, we review research background on reasoning and
analysis of secure and scalable workflow provenance system. In Chapter 3, we propose our
query language and create the constructs to facilitate complex queries in a visual workflow
style. In Chapter 4, we propose secure access control policies and validate it with policy
quality requirements. In Chapter 5, we explore the use of data mining approaches in the
DATAVIEW workflow system to understand the initial feasibility of our approach. Finally,
in Chapter 6, we draw concluding remarks of the dissertation and provide the directions
for future work.
5CHAPTER 1 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Provenance refers to the information about the derivation history of a data prod-
uct [46, 35]. It is important for evaluating the quality and trustworthiness of a data
product and ensuring the reproducibility of scientific discoveries [64, 41]. Much research
has been done on storing and querying scientific workflow provenance - a provenance that
is produced in the execution of data-centric scientific workflows [35, 14]. Since scientific
workflow provenance are essentially directed acyclic graphs, a leading trend of querying
models is the graph-based querying models, represented by two provenance graph query
languages: OPQL [85] and QLP [14]. While QLP provides query constructs for querying
both structure and lineage information in provenance graphs, OPQL, in addition, supports
the Open Provenance Model [100], a community-driven data model, which captures main
aspects of the workflow provenance and does not enforce a particular physical representa-
tion of the provenance data.
1.1 The OPM Provenance Model
The Open Provenance Model (OPM) is the first community-based provenance model
that supports the digital representation and inference of provenance [91]. In this model,
provenance data is modeled as directed acyclic graphs in which there are three types of
nodes, Artifact, Process, and Agent, and five types of edges, Used,WasGeneratedBy,WasCon-
trolledBy, WasTriggeredBy, and WasDerivedFrom. In the domain of big data workflows, for
example, artifacts are mapped to data products, processes are mapped to workflow tasks,
and agents are mapped to data scientists who perform the execution of a workflow task.
Meanwhile, Used links a workflow task to an input data product; WasGeneratedBy links an
output data product to a workflow task;WasControlledBy links a workflow task to the data
scientist who performs its execution;WasTriggeredBy links a downstream workflow task to
an immediate upstream workflow task, and WasDerivedFrom links an output data product
of a workflow task to an input data product of the same workflow task. The OPM model is
illustrated in Figure 1. The OPM model specification does not include querying languages
6for provenance, which is the motivation for efforts including OPQL and QLP. Formally, a
provenance graph PG = (N, E) consists of:
• a set of nodes N = A
⋃
P
⋃
AG, where A is a set of artifacts, P is a set of processes,
and AG is a set of agents;
• a set of directed edges E = Eu
⋃
Eg
⋃
Ed
⋃
Et
⋃
Ec
where i) Eu ⊆ P × A and (p, a) ∈ Eu states that process p used artifact a.
ii) Eg ⊆ A × P and (a, p) ∈ Eg states that artifact a was generated by process p.
iii) Ed ⊆ A × A and (a1, a2) ∈ Ed states that artifact a1 was derived from artifact a2.
iv) Et ⊆ P × P and (p1, p2) ∈ Et states that process p1 was triggered by process p2.
v) Ec ⊆ P × AG and (p, ag) ∈ Ec states that process p was controlled by agent ag.
Figure 1: OPM Provenance Model.
71.2 The PROV-DM Provenance Model
Another provenance data model was introduced in 2013, named PROV-DM. Fig. 2 rep-
resents PROV-DM provenance model. The PROV provenance model is more generic and
domain-agnostic. The PROV set of specifications is designed to promote easily exploited
nodes and relations for modeling specific domains. This provenance model offers interop-
erability across diverse provenance management systems and accommodates data genera-
tion from a diverse data sources.
PROV provenance model has flexibility when it deals with attributes. Most of the prove-
nance statements are annotated with optional attributes. This provenance model has a
mechanism for asserting provenance of provenance specified as ’bundles’. To avoid to
make the model unnecessary complex, PROV-DM does not model uncertainty. In Table. 1,
we can see the types and relations in PROV-DM.
The PROV-DM provenance model is the conceptual data model that forms a basis for
the W3C provenance (PROV) family of specifications [61], which currently contains four
recommendations and eight notes. PROV-DM is one of the four recommendations, be-
sides PROV-O, the PROV ontology, an OWL2 ontology allowing the mapping of the PROV
data model to RDF; PROV-NA, a notation for provenance aimed at human consumption;
PROV-CONSTRAINTS, a set of constraints applying to the PROV-DM data model. Like
OPM, PROV-DM also models provenance as a directed acyclic graph, in which there are
three types of nodes, Entity, Activity, and Agent, and seven types of edges, Used, Was-
GeneratedBy, WasAssociatedWith, WasInformedBy, WasDerivedFrom, ActedOnBehalfOf, and
WasAttributedTo. The number of types of nodes in PROV-DM is the same as in OPM, but
their names are different. In PROV-DM, Artifact becomes Entity, Process becomes Activity,
and Agent remains the same. Moreover, two edge types are introduced: ActedOnBehalfOf,
to model delegation relationships between agents, and WasAttributedTo, to model attribu-
tion of entities to agents; and two edge types are renamed: WasTriggeredBy was renamed
to WasInformedBy, and WasControlledBy to WasAssociatedWith. In the domain of big data
8workflows, for example, entities are mapped to data products, activities are mapped to
workflow tasks, and agents are mapped to data scientists who perform the execution of
a workflow task. Meanwhile, Used links a workflow task to an input data product; Was-
GeneratedBy links an output data product to a workflow task; WasAssociatedWith links
a workflow task to the data scientist who performs its execution; WasInformedBy links
a downstream workflow task to an immediate upstream workflow task, WasDerivedFrom
links an output data product of a workflow task to an input data product of the same work-
flow task, ActedOnBehalfOf links a data scientist to another, and WasAttributedTo links a
data product to a data scientist. The PROV-DM model is illustrated in Figure 2. Like OPM,
the PROV-DM model specification does not include querying languages for provenance
either. Formally, a provenance graph PG = (N, E) in PROV-DM consists of:
• a set of nodes N = EN
⋃
AC
⋃
AG, where EN is a set of entities, AC is a set of
activities, and AG is a set of agents, based on the PROV-DM model.
• a set of directed edges E = Eu
⋃
Eg
⋃
Ed
⋃
Ei
⋃
Ea
⋃
Eab
⋃
Eat
where i) Eu ⊆ AC × EN and (ac, en) ∈ Eu means that activity ac used entity en.
ii) Eg ⊆ EN × AC and (en, ac) ∈ Eg means that entity en was generated by activity
ac.
iii) Ed ⊆ EN × EN and (en1, en2) ∈ Ed means that entity en1 was derived from entity
en2.
iv) Ei ⊆ AC × AC and (ac1, ac2) ∈ Ei means that activity ac1 was informed by activity
ac2.
v) Ea ⊆ AC × AG and (ac, ag) ∈ Ea means that activity ac was associated with agent
ag.
vi) Eab ⊆ AG × AG and (ag1, ag2) ∈ Eab means that agent ag1 acted on behalf of agent
ag2.
vii) Eat ⊆ EN× AG and (en, ag) ∈ Eat means that entity en was attributed to agent ag.
9Figure 2: PROV-DM Provenance Model.
Table 1: PROV-DM Core Concepts Mapping to Types and Relations [4].
PROV concepts PROV-DM types or relations Name
Entity Entity
Activity PROV-DM Types Activity
Agent Agent
Generation WasGeneratedBy
Usage Used
Communication WasInformedBy
Derivation PROV-DM Relations WasDerivedFrom
Attribution WasAttributedTo
Association WasAssociatedWith
Delegation ActedOnBehalfOf
1.3 Provenance Query Language: OPQL
OPQL (Open Provenance Query Language) is a provenance query language that en-
ables the querying of provenance directly at the graph level. One advantage of OPQL is
that, OPQL queries are tightly coupled to the underlying provenance storage strategies. As
a result, OPQL can be implemented on top of various storage or database systems. Another
advantage of OPQL is its practical expressiveness: a provenance query formulated in OPQL
is more concise than its counterparts in other query languages such as SQL, SPARQL, and
XQuery, which often need recursive formulation for lineage queries [85]. OPQL includes
10
six types of graph patterns, a provenance graph algebra, and has clear syntax and seman-
tics to support querying provenance at the graph level. The initial implementation of OPQL
shows the feasibility and efficiency of OPQL [85, 84]. A basic OPQL query can be defined
in the following ways:
• Single node construct A, P , and AG.
• Single-step-edge-forward constructs USD, WGB,WCB,WDF , andWTB.
• Single-step-edge-backward constructs USD∧,WGB∧, WCB∧,WDF∧, andWTB∧.
• Multi-step-edge constructs USD∗, WGB∗,WDF∗,WTB∗,WDF∧∗ andWTB∧∗.
In addition, composite queries can be composed from basic queries by connectives
UNION, INTERSECT, or MINUS. OPQL is based on the OPM provenance model. This
paper extends OPQL to OPQL 2.0 to support the PROV-DM provenance model.
1.3.1 Apache Pig
Apache Pig is a fairly competitive framework for processing and continuous optimiza-
tion, enhanced with new features and maintained by Yahoo! Researchers [109]. It is a
platform for analyzing large data sets. Pig’s language, Pig Latin, is a simple to understand
data flow language. Its query algebra expresses data transformations such as merging data
sets, filtering them and applying functions to records or groups of records. This supports
rich, multi-valued and nested operations on large datasets. Pig Latin scripts describe Di-
rected Acyclic Graph where edges are data flows, and the nodes are operators that process
the data [1]. Pig is extensible to a user-defined function written in Java and other lan-
guages. Pig scripts provide a high-level language to create the map-reduce jobs needed
to process data in Hadoop cluster [1]. In Fig. 3, the overall framework of Apache pig is
presented graphically.
The advantage of using Apache Pig is that it is independent of Hadoop framework
changes and can be benefited by all the optimization techniques offered by Pig developer
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Figure 3: The Framework of Apache Pig.
community. Moreover, as Pig is backward compatible, further developments or optimiza-
tions will not affect any single line of code. During runtime, the resulting Pig Latin script
automatically maps into a sequence of MapReduce iterations. Hence, complicated deploy-
ment, configuration or installation do not require. We use Pig Latin operator in our transla-
tion. One benefit of choosing Apache Pig to implement OPQL is that, further optimization
and development in both the MapReduce community and the Apache Pig community can
immediately benefit OPQL users, which do not need to rewrite a single OPQL query.
We explain each instruction of pig performed in our case in the later section. The more
detail description of each operation of Apache Pig is in Pig Latin Manual [1].
12
1.4 Provenance Security
Recently, the notion of collaborative scientific workflows has been proposed to ad-
dress the increasing need for collaborative data analytics using the scientific workflow
paradigm. In such collaborative environments, adequate access control policies are neces-
sary for controlling the sharing of workflows, data products, and provenance information
among collaborating parties. In particular, the protection of workflow provenance is criti-
cal as such provenance often encodes the detailed protocol of a scientific experiment and
constitutes the intellectual property of the respective stakeholders. Meanwhile, scientific
workflows feature quick evolution; therefore, corresponding access control policies for
workflow provenance need to evolve as well, and it is important to ensure that the evo-
lution of workflow provenance access control policies meets certain qualities to guarantee
the correctness and performance of the policy enforcement engine.
1.4.1 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) consists of the following components: U, R, P, S.
Here U stands for a set of users in a system, R stands for a set of rules, P for permission
and S for the session. In a dynamic system, User (U) might change, where a user might
join or leave; Role (R) might change, an administrator might add more roles in the system
or delete some roles from the system, and Permission (P) also might change.
The policy access control rights are associated with roles, where access rights are given
to specified roles for accessing certain resources. Users are assigned to designated roles and
be part of access control policies. Users can authenticate themselves through activation of
one or more roles for themselves.
Some benefits of using Role-based access control are:
• Policy doesn’t require to be updated when a certain user with a role leaves the system.
• When a new user assigned to an active role, all the required resources automatically
allocated to the user for that role.
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• Revisiting least privilege, which means a user in one role has access to a subset of
resources, and when they switch roles they gain access to other resources.
In RBAC, permission can be set based on objects with their actions. The action rep-
resents the operation performed on the object which could be read or write operation or
in perspective of database it could be select, update, delete operations, etc. The sign for
permission is either positive or negative. Positive permission means positive authoriza-
tion where a particular action is allowed on this object and negative permission means
authorization of action on that object is not permitted.
There is permission assignment function which assigns permission to roles. For each
role, this function assigns a set of permissions where an input is a role and output is a
set of permission. This is a subset of the cross product of R × P . For particular function,
different permission can be assigned for a role in a different time frame. The assigned
permission for a role can be changed over time to different permission.
In RBAC, there is also a user assignment function. One of the typical examples of user
assignment function is one student who designated as a GRA now can be later appointed
as GTA. In user function, each session assigns to a single user. The session is not shared
between users, and each session only allows one user. But role can be different in a specific
session. For example, for log-in a particular terminal in Unix, where a user can be a regular
user or pseudo-user.
The administrator’s job is to specify access control policy first regarding the access
rights. In policy enforcement phase, policies are enforced when users perform actions.
The action rights are determined by access control policies. In other words, if access
control policies are positive then the task can be executed; otherwise, the task cannot be
accomplished. Concerning the databases, access control policies are consulted first before
the update a table or delete a row or update a column, etc. Similarly, to open a file,
close a file, delete a file, update a file, append a file in the operating system, we can also
use access control policies to control the access to files. Policy analysis observes all the
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actions performed in a particular system either in the database system, workflow system
or operating system. Policy analysis evaluates the quality of the policy and then determine
how to improve the quality of policy.
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CHAPTER 2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Related Work of Provenance
In general, the provenance management system deals with efficiency and effective-
ness of capturing, storing, representing, querying, and visualizing provenance data. In
this chapter, we first discuss the provenance capture in perspective of different existing
scientific workflow provenance management systems. We then discuss related work on
provenance models and applications as well as their analysis and visualization. Lastly the
recent trends in provenance query and big data provenance state-of-the-art frameworks,
methods and mechanisms are presented.
2.1.1 Provenance Query and Big Data Provenance
Provenance problems become prohibitive and very hard to solve when applied to big
data repositories. There are many avenues of research challenges and open issues in big
data provenance research [52, 53]. Several relevant and advanced concepts and chal-
lenges in big data provenance research can arise. They include accessing big data, an-
alyzing big data, scalability issues, information sharing, query optimization issues, data
modeling support for provenance, flexible provenance query tools, etc. [119]. Reduce and
Map provenance (RAMP) [72, 103] is one of such big data provenance systems that pro-
poses a wrapper based method as an extension of Hadoop by deploying on top of Hadoop.
Another extension of Hadoop for implementing provenance detection in MapReduce jobs
is called Hadoop-Prov [119, 9]. The proposed system minimizes overheads and computes
provenance by providing flexible tools for querying the big data provenance graph.
There is a hybrid big data provenance system named Pig Lipstick [13], that combines
the management of fine-grained dependencies, with the management of workflow-grained
dependencies [119, 13]. Fine-grained dependencies are typical of database-oriented prove-
nance systems, and workflow-grained dependencies are typical of workflow-oriented prove-
nance systems. Another type of big data provenance supports the functionalities of layer-
based architecture by focusing on provenance collection, querying and visualization of
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provenance in the context of specialized scientific applications [7]. In the cloud envi-
ronment, there is a proposed framework for integration, modeling and monitoring data
provenance called CloudProv [120]. For real-time applications, this framework continu-
ously acquires and monitors all of the collected provenance information. Another proposed
big data provenance framework [59] is based on fine-grained provenance through several
operator instrumentations of a query. An innovative privacy-preserving public auditing
mechanism in untrusted Cloud environments is Oruta [127]. This mechanism supports
data sharing.
2.1.2 Provenance Capture and query in Scientific workflow systems
There are several scientific workflow provenance management system working towards
data collection and capturing provenance.
In Kepler [25, 26] the provenance framework is called Collection Oriented Modeling
and Design (COMAD) for nested data collections and captures explicit data dependencies.
Here provenance information is automatically stored in the relational database with all
immediate and transitive closure dependencies derived from provenance reasoning for
each node [123, 15]. The COMAD-Kepler provenance system supports the querying of
the imported provenance metadata through a high-level query language and an external
reasoning engine.
Taverna [97, 95] keeps a logbook plugin based on a provenance ontology to capture
provenance information from the workflow. The provenance collection plugin captures
both internal provenances locally generated by workflow, and external provenance gath-
ered from third party data providers. Taverna supports the use of a fine-grained data
lineage model to perform query collection-based workflow provenance effectively [98]. To
store, manage and query provenance, Taverna uses RDF store mechanism and Semantic
Web technologies for representing provenance metadata.
Karma [113] captures both process and data provenance from a user-driven work-
flow system by storing provenance meta-data in a two-layer information model. Karma’s
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provenance model layers are registry level and execution level. Registry level records the
metadata of services and data that may be used in an execution sequence. An execution
level models instances of the registry level and records the execution-related information
of data products generated by each invocation [31]. To store and query provenance meta-
data Karma uses XML and relational database technologies [31, 126, 112].
In VisTrails [111, 57], the provenance management system captures provenance infor-
mation by using change-based provenance mechanism for data products. Also captures all
the generated data products in the process of evolution of workflow. This uses relational
database and XML to store and query provenance metadata. The provenance management
system queries are supported by XQuery for querying exported XML specification and im-
plementing recursive functions to query the transitive closure dependencies. VisTrails can
visualize query results by matching query conditions with the VisTrails query language
(vtPQL).
Another scientific workflow management system is Swift [134]. It uses provenance for
on-demand data generation, tracking the data derivation history, and data product vali-
dation. Swift also uses the relational database in order to manage and query provenance
metadata.
VIEW [35, 84, 124, 107] supports provenance store and query for both prospective
and retrospective provenance collection. Two independent systems RDFProv and OPM-
Prov [37, 85] has developed under the umbrella of the VIEW system. The noWorkflow
system [101] captures provenance information from scripts and YesWorkflow [94] pro-
vides a script with an annotation mechanism to describe prospective provenance.
Panda [73] is a general purpose open-source system that supports provenance cap-
ture, storage, operator, and queries. This system seamlessly merges both data-based
and process-based provenance. It also develops a model and system from fine-grained
to coarse-grained provenance, defines useful operators for taking advantage of captured
provenance, defines general purpose language for querying, and analyzes provenance and
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combining provenance with relevant data.
2.1.3 Provenance Analysis and Visualization
Provenance visualization can be classified into two ways: workflow management sys-
tems that have built-in provenance visualization and standalone provenance visualization
tools [79]. The built-in provenance visualization tools [11, 30, 70] allows the easy integra-
tion of provenance collection and analysis. However, they do not support the visualization
of data by other workflowmanagement systems and different standalone provenance gath-
ering tools. These built-in provenance visualizations in workflow management systems
also have shortcoming for viewing graph manipulation features for provenance graphs.
On the other hand, there are standalone provenance visualization tools. Provenance
explorer [40] dynamically generate customized views of provenance trail by taking RDF-
based provenance outputs from capture system. This provenance model is based on the
ABC ontology model and lacking the support for data processing activities in the digital
domain. Hence, they support only one expansion level instead of multiple levels of detail.
The ZOOM prototype allows users to dynamically update the provenance graph for the
new view by hiding irrelevant information. It supports users with an interface to query
provenance information through SQL queries which generated by a workflow system.
There is a web-based visualization tool based on the PROV-DM model called PROV-O-
Viz [68]. This tool uses Sankey Diagrams for visualization to visualize flow magnitude be-
tween nodes in a network. Provenance Explorer is limited to specific domains and ZOOM,
PROV-O-Viz requires additional knowledge, they are not compatible with provenance data
from other tools like Kepler, VisTrails, Taverna. The stand-alone tools provide some inter-
esting features such as interactive graphs, summary nodes, level of details, filters, merges,
but do not implement them in an integrated way.
There is another prototype system called Provenance Difference Viewer (PDiffView)
that enables users to compare the differences between two runs which is two provenance
graphs of the same workflow specification. Based on [135], the PROV Translator tool
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provides graph visualizations.
2.1.4 Provenance Models and Applications
In a provenance management system, one of the main issues is to make the system in-
teroperability among different scientific workflow management systems. IPAW workshop
first initiated this idea in 2006 through Provenance Challenge series and as a result came
up with standardized provenance model called Open Provenance Model (OPM). The OPM
model [3, 6, 104] efficiently allows provenance information exchange between systems
regardless of compatibility layer on shared provenance model. This model defines prove-
nance in a precise and technology-agnostic manner, facilitate developers to build and share
tools to operate on any such provenance systems, defines a set of core rules to identify the
valid inferences that can make on provenance representation. OPM was originally crafted
in 2007 and released to the community with version OPM v1.00. Later revised in 2008 with
version OPM v1.01 and again in 2009 with OPM v1.1. OPM uses directed graph to express
the dependencies.
Recently, the well-accepted provenance model is PROV-DM. PROV-DM was adopted
here because of its core structures to distinct extended structures toward a step forward to
interoperability. Core structures provide domain-agnostic vocabularies by serving essence
of provenance information, whereas extended structures are more towards enhancing and
refining more significant capabilities for more advanced uses of provenance.
Only a few of scientific workflow system have adopted the PROV extension. Taverna is
one of them [15]. DataONE scientific workflow and provenance working group specified
D-PROV provenance model [96]. Few PROV applications use and extend PROV, the name
of those projects are UrbanMatch [118, 32], which extends PROV model by using Human
computation ontology and CollabMap [105], to record provenance information that logs
citizens actions [96].
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2.2 Related Work on Provenance Security
For business workflows, the importance and requirements of security are well under-
stood [117, 49, 24, 8, 67, 23, 17]. In perspective of the workflow system, the requirements
for security can be managed by either the workflow system itself [121] or by an outside
engine [42]. Most of the security work has been done in authentication [93], authoriza-
tion [128, 18, 69, 108, 115, 76], data privacy and secure workflow models [71, 75]. The
security issues of provenance have recently been identified by some researchers [27, 116].
The authors of [38] formalize a model for provenance with security properties like dis-
closure and obfuscation on workflow provenance graph, database queries, and automata.
They explain the most general form of provenance for the system through traces. Their
framework defines primarily the static provenance situation, not dynamic provenance in
an existing system.
In [28, 66], the authors address a number of research questions on provenance secu-
rity and develop a mechanism for securing provenance by using appropriate encryption
and digital signature. They allow auditors to check the integrity of provenance without
necessary access to underlying data and vice versa [38]. In [66], the authors maintain the
integrity of provenance records in a stateful system and prevent forgery.
Based on the work of Cheney et. al.[39], Chong [43] formulated a syntactic model
of traces and proposed semantic definitions of provenance security policies. Chong [43]
formalized two properties, "provenance security" and "data security". In provenance secu-
rity, the provenance of a workflow run is not inferred from data, whereas, in data security,
high-security workflow data are not inferred from its provenance.
In [47], Davidson et al. proposed a formal definition of privacy and confidentiality
policies for workflow provenance and formalize the notion of privacy and focus on a math-
ematical model for solving privacy-preserving view as a result of the query by an auditor.
Their approach is theoretic and does not provide a framework for provenance models for
addressing security.
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In [16], the authors investigated the problem of securing data provenance in the cloud
and propose the schema that supports encrypted search while protecting the confidentiality
of data provenance stored in the cloud. Their main contribution of the proposed approach
is that neither an adversary nor a cloud service provider learns about the data provenance
or the query [16].
The Secure Provenance (SPROV) scheme in [66, 65], provides security assurances of
confidentiality and integrity of the data provenance and automatically collects data prove-
nance at the application layer. They ensure confidentiality by employing state-of-the-art
encryption techniques where integrity is preserved by using the digital signature of the
user who takes actions. SPROV scheme has some limitations too. It does not provide con-
fidentiality to the source data whose data provenance is being recorded, and it does not
provide any mechanisms to query data provenance [16].
PSecOn scheme in [74] proposes a cyber laboratory to collaborate and share scientific
resources for provenance security from the origin. The integrity of the scientific results and
corresponding data provenance can be ensured through PSecOn scheme in an e-science
grid. This scheme encrypts the source data. The limitation of PSecOn is its strong as-
sumption of relying on a trusted infrastructure, restricting the possibility of managing data
provenance in the cloud [16].
Lu et al. [89], introduce a scheme to manage data provenance in the cloud and pro-
vided users access to the online data where data is shared among multiple users. Confi-
dentiality and integrity are guaranteed through user encryption. This work signs the data
where a cloud service provider receives and verifies the signature before storing that data.
The main drawback of this approach is that it only traces the user while it does not provide
any details about how the data provenance is managed by the cloud service provider [16].
Aldeco et al. [10] provide concrete cryptographic constructs to ensure the integrity of
data provenance. They describe four stages: recording provenance, storing provenance,
querying provenance and analyzing provenance graph for answering questions regarding
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the execution of the entities in the system. When data provenance is recorded and stored,
integrity is ensured. The limitation is lack of details about how to provide confidentiality
to data provenance.
In [28], data provenance is considered as a causality graph with annotations. They
focus on security model of data provenance at the abstract level. They mention the security
of data provenance is different from the source data. They describe access controls but do
not address how to define and enforce these access controls.
Security issues related to a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) based provenance sys-
tem is discussed in [116]. Here they suggest to restrain auditors by limiting the access to
the results of a query using cryptographic techniques, but they have no concrete solution.
In [36], the authors provide a secure view of workflow provenance where they define
security specification based on only inheritance. They did not provide any provenance
access control policies or any quality analysis for their proposed protocol.
2.3 Related Work on Autism, Scientific Workflow and Machine Learn-
ing
Little research has been conducted on the amalgamation of machine learning, data
mining, and autism data analysis. Aforementioned is a comparatively new area where a
behavioral and neurological problem can be deciphered in perspective of machine learning
and data mining techniques. The research in this area mostly gained attention since 2009.
Currently, there is no uniform platform for addressing all the issues. We have discussed
some of the related work done in the area of ASD based on scientific workflow system,
machine learning, and data mining.
An automatic alert system, Autistic Child Sensor and Assistant System (ACSA), has
been developed for autistic children and their families for protecting the child from over-
stimulating environments, incidents, and injuries, using wireless sensor network [12]. This
system is for detecting and processing autistic movement based on machine learning algo-
rithms. The ACSA works on three different components: ACSA wearable sensory device is
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worn by the autistic child on the appropriate location of their body determined by physi-
cian or family; ACSA parent application is on parents’ smart devices, and machine learning
algorithms are used for actively recognizing and accurately detecting child’s gesture and
motion.
The presence of discriminative eye movement patterns in ASD individuals, a prediction
system has been developed for discovering the latent patterns based on eye movement
from the sequentially recorded image [88]. There are other studies that show how the
machine learning process is used to optimize the diagnosis process by tracking eye move-
ments of ASD children [22, 80, 50]. When compared to typically developing individual,
ASD children and adults show reduced visual attention to faces [54]. Work in [129, 130]
shows the evidence of different eye movement by ASD individuals when scanning faces.
There are Autism and Emotion sub-challenges introduced by INTERSPEECH 2013 com-
putational Paralinguistics Challenge [83]. They provide the result based on an integration
of multiple well-known machine learning techniques, like Support vector machine, Deep
neural network, Weighted discrete K-nearest neighbor; and ASM (Acoustic segment model)
approach.
A human-robot interaction technique is a possible future direction for modeling the be-
havior of children with autism [110]. There are case studies and anecdotal evidence that
shows children with autism exhibit improved social behavior with robots. They have used
two machine learning techniques Conditional Random Fields(CRF) and Decision Trees.
CRF is used to classify the segment in time series data generated by experiment and de-
cision tree C4.5 algorithm is in order to predict vocalization. There are some research
groups who have used robots for children with autism in [56, 81, 106].
The approach in [62] provides a better understanding of Autism Spectrum Disorder
by selecting features for identifying subtypes of autism to determine the effectiveness of
clustering for further classification purposes.
Also research has been done on the mining ASD data based on twitter information
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[19]. This is the first paper focusing on using Twitter for data-mining information related
to ASD. Their investigation gives more concerns, practices and generally more topics in
conversation with people interested in ASD and motivating further work towards that
direction.
Another data mining technology has been used for investigating feature selection in
gene expression [82]. They used classification method for selecting genes and gene se-
quences between ASD and healthy cases.
AMP (Autism Management Platform) [87] is a mobile application and intelligent web
interface for capturing, analyzing and managing data which is associated with diagnosis
and treatment of ASD. Though continuous data management is a challenge, this analytic
platform aggregates and mines patient data in real-time and gives relevant feedback based
on automatically learned data by filtering preferences over time.
Although some research work has been done in the Autism community with machine
learning and data mining, the scientific workflow community has not began to explore this
area. There is no state-of-the-art collaboration of scientific workflow and autism.
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CHAPTER 3 SCALABLE PROVENANCE QUERY FRAMEWORK
Recently, big data workflows have emerged as the next generation of data-centric work-
flow technologies to address the five “V" challenges of big data: volume, variety, velocity,
veracity, and value [122, 78]. While scientific workflows focused on data flow and au-
tomation management [86], big data workflows focus on large-scale data processing and
analytics with a “scale-out" architecture and a “moving-computation-to-data" processing
paradigm [51]. As both data and workflow increase in their scale, the scale of provenance
naturally increases as well, calling for new scalable storage and querying infrastructure for
big data workflow provenance.
To this end, we propose to leverage Pig Latin [102], a high-level platform for creating
programs that run on Apache Hadoop, and OPQL [85], the most famous graph-level prove-
nance query language, to build scalable provenance storage and querying system. Apache
Pig is a platform for analyzing large datasets on top of Hadoop with a rich, multi-valued,
and nested data model. Pig’s language, Pig Latin, is a comprehensive imperative query lan-
guage that let users express data transformation such as filtering datasets, merging them
and applying functions to groups of records or records. It is a simple data flow language,
yet a fast iterative language with an efficient MapReduce compilation engine. Pig Latin
gives a higher level of abstraction than the MapReduce procedural model by providing
join, a filter like relational style operators, which are not feasible in MapReduce out of the
box.
Meanwhile, OPQL is a graph-level provenance query language that includes graph pat-
terns. It is based on a rigid provenance graph algebra and explicit syntax and semantics.
As OPQL queries are not tightly coupled to the underlying provenance storage strategies,
a OPQL user does not need to be aware of the underlying schema design. Moreover, OPQL
is technology-independent, and therefore can be integrated with any big data workflow
system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort to ensure both scalability
(leveraging a scalable platform) and usability (leveraging a graph-level provenance query
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language) of provenance querying in the area of big data workflows.
Our main contributions are: i) we extend OPQL 1.0 (for the OPM model) to OPQL 2.0
in order to support the W3C PROV-DM standard provenance model, the current de facto
standard provenance model. This model extends OPM with additional features to capture
provenance and accommodate the Web; ii) we propose framework and efficient algorithms
to translate OPQL constructs to equivalent Pig Latin programs; iii) we develop and evaluate
our system on provenance datasets from the UTPB benchmark; and (iv) we create some
visual OPQL constructs in the DATAVIEW big data workflow system to facilitate the easy
creation of complex OPQL queries in a visual workflow style. Our preliminary experimental
study shows the feasibility of our framework for big data workflow provenance storage and
querying.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, we propose a new
framework called OPQLPig to translate OPQL constructs to equivalent Pig Latin programs.
Section 3.2 proposes our extension of OPQL to support the PROV-DM provenance model.
The algorithm for translating OPQL to Pig Latin is presented in Section 3.3. In Section
3.4, we explain our proposed framework and algorithm with a sample query case study.
Finally, in Section 3.5, we discuss data preparation and an experimental section with some
visual OPQLPig constructs in the DATAVIEW, a big data workflow system to facilitate the
easy creation of complex OPQLPig queries in a visual workflow style.
3.1 OPQLPig Querying Framework
OPQLPig is an integrated system of Storage and Query engines and its underlying
MapReduce and Apache Hadoop framework. Though there are several concurrent projects
like DryadLINQ, Hive, Jaql, Sawzall, Scope, etc., blending Pig with its underlying Hadoop
execution engine shows an impressive benefit of scalability and fault tolerance. OPQLPig
system takes datasets from a OPQL client; processing the data in the storage engine; trans-
late a OPQL query into Pig Latin program; parse and compile into Pig and one or more
MapReduce Jobs; and execute those jobs in Hadoop cluster. We will discuss each of the
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Figure 4: OPQLPig Architecture.
parts of the system in this section.
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3.1.1 Storage Engine
Data Modeling and Representation:
The provenance can be captured in any form of modeling and representation like PROV-
DM, PROV-O and RDF/XML, RDF/Turtle or RDF/NTriple. For our OPQLPig system we
have used UTPB benchmark for capturing provenance data from templates presented
in [34].
Data Loading:
After capturing provenance data, we perform the data loading phase for creating the
dataset in our feasible format and store that in Hadoop Distributed File system for query-
ing. For storing the dataset the feasible format we have used is: source_node, source_node_type,
destination_node, destination_node_type, relation_construct.
3.1.2 Query Engine
The proposed Query engine has three major functional units with three unique respon-
sibilities: Query Translation, Apache Pig, and Query execution.
Query Translation:
First, all OPQLPig queries are passed through the OPQLPig parser in order to verify their
syntactic correctness. Each of the constructs of OPQLPig is transformed into its cor-
responding Pig program through a dedicated shell script for each relation in PROV-DM
model. The description of each translation from PROV-DM relations to its correspondence
pig latin program is explained in section 3.3.
Apache Pig:
After translating the OPQLPig query into a Pig Latin program which consists of a sequence
of instructions, each instruction performs a single data transformation. During the phase
of Pig parser schema inference, type checking and all referenced variables are defined. The
output of the parser is arranged as a Directed Graph which is a logical plan of one-to-one
correspondence between pig latin statements and logical operators [58].
Query Execution:
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The MapReduce jobs in the graph are topologically sorted and submitted to the Job Sched-
uler’s Name node. Finally, jobs are executed in that order inside Hadoop cluster’s data
node. OPQLPig Querying Framework is represented in Fig. 4.
3.2 Extending OPQL to support PROV-DM
3.2.1 Provenance Constructs
We have modified the constructs based on the PROV-DM standard for all Single-node
constructs, Single-step construct (edge-forward and edge-backward) and Multi-step-edge
construct.
Single-node Construct:
We have formulated our single-node construct in the following formulation. As a single
node construct we have Entities, Activities and Agents. Here enn, acn and agn are single
node identifiers and Xn is a node expression which can be denoted by either entity node
expression Xen, an activity node expression Xac or an agent node expression Xag.
EN(Xen) = {enn | enn ∈ Xen}
AC(Xac) = {acn | acn ∈ Xac}
AG(Xag) = {agn | agn ∈ Xag}
Single-step Construct:
In a Single-step construct, there are Single-step-edge-forward construct and Single-step-
edge-backward construct. We formulate all the relations in both directions. For each
relation in the PROV data model we develop single step constructs. For example; for
“Used relation" we develop “USD construct"; for “wasGeneratedBy relation" we develop
“WGB construct"; for “wasAssociatedWith relation" we develop “WAW construct"; for “was-
DerivedFrom relation" we develop “WDF construct"; and for “wasInformedBy relation" we
develop “WIB construct"; both for edge forward and edge backward direction. These con-
structs support tracking the ancestor nodes associated with the relations. For every causal
dependency between two nodes, if we provide a node expression Xn for effect nodes, we
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receive cause nodes in return. In any single-step-edge-forward constructs when the source
node is given, it returns the cause node which is the destination node or nodes. For any
single-step-edge-backward constructs, for a given cause node, it returns the effect node
which the source of the arc.
USD(Xac) = {enn | acn ∈ Xac and (acn, enn) ∈ Eu}
WGB(Xen) = {acn | enn ∈ Xen and (enn, acn) ∈ Eg}
WAW (Xac) = {agn | acn ∈ Xac and (acn, agn) ∈ Ea}
WDF (Xenn1) = {enn2 | enn1 ∈ Xen and (enn1, enn2) ∈ Ed}
WIB(Xacn1) = {acn2 | acn1 ∈ Xac and (acn1, acn2) ∈ Ei}
ACO(Xagn1) = {agn2 | agn1 ∈ Xag and (agn1, agn2) ∈ Eab}
WAT (Xen) = {agn | enn ∈ Xen and (enn, agn) ∈ Eat}
USD∧(Xen) = {acn | enn ∈ Xen and (acn, enn) ∈ Eu}
WGB∧(Xac) = {enn | acn ∈ Xac and (enn, acn) ∈ Eg}
WAW∧(Xag) = {acn | agn ∈ Xag and (acn, agn) ∈ Ea}
WDF∧(Xenn2) = {enn1 | enn2 ∈ Xen and (enn1, enn2) ∈ Ed}
WIB∧(Xacn2) = {acn1 | acn2 ∈ Xac and (acn1, acn2) ∈ Ei}
ACO∧(Xagn2) = {agn1 | agn2 ∈ Xag and (agn1, agn2) ∈ Eab}
WAT∧(Xag) = {enn | enn ∈ Xen and (enn, agn) ∈ Eat}
Multi-step Construct:
Multi-step Constructs are a little bit more complicated, it uses both directions of the single-
step constructs in a repetitive way. In this multi-step construct, all nodes are returned
with either direct or transitive dependencies in the relations. These constructs give us the
flexibility and feasibility to track ancestor nodes without formulating any recursive queries.
For example, in WDF ∗(Xen) construct, returns all the entities that contributed to derive
entity from the given entity. The same rule applies for WIB∗(Xac) construct. It returns
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all the activities that contributed to derive activity from the given activity. However, for
multi-step constructs, such asWGB∗(Xen) and USD
∗(Xac), this scenario is little different.
For construct WGB∗(Xen), a given source entity first derives contributed activities and
then based on the set of returned activities it loops through WIB∗ construct, and finds
all of the contributing activities; and then perform the join operation to find all transitive
relations for given entity. The same building rule apply for USD∗(Xac). For the USD
∗(Xac)
construct, we can derive all of the contributed entities for a given activity. To do this
USD(Xac) first returns the set of entities associated with that and then execute WDF
∗
construct to find all the rest of the entities contributed to that activity.
WDF ∗(Xen) = {enn |
⋃
enn∈WDF (Xen)
WDF ∗(enn) ∪ WDF (Xen)}
WIB∗(Xac) = {acn |
⋃
acn∈WIB(Xac)
WIB∗(acn) ∪ WIB(Xac)}
WGB∗(Xen) = {acn |
⋃
enn∈WGB(Xen)
WIB∗(acn) ∪ WGB(Xen)}
USD∗(Xac) = {enn |
⋃
acn∈USD(Xac)
WDF ∗(enn) ∪ USD(Xac)}
3.3 Translating OPQL to Pig Latin
In this section, we explain the translation of OPQL to OPQLPig. We translate each of
the constructs to Pig Latin script. The implementation of each of the constructs is handled
through separate shell scripts, because Pig Latin does not support loops and conditionals.
As each of the constructs is designed to handle inference queries, it needs to traverse the
whole provenance graph to provide query answer. In order to handle such a scenario, a
shell script is used to run multi-step-edge-constructs by provisioning join operations in one
pig file, going through a loop. In addition, the loop break condition is handled by a shell
script. The join operation generates a set of records which provide transitive relation and
the loop condition will break when there will be no new transitive relations. The loop break
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condition measures the file size, and if there are no new relations, which means file size
zero, then loop break will happen. The last step of each construct is to run another Pig file
which will retrieve all the destination nodes along the path computed by join operations.
The pseudo code of translating from OPQL to OPQLPig for single-step and multi-step
constructs are summarized in algorithms in Figs. 5, 6 and 7.
Figure 5: Driver Function of Multi-step USD* Construct.
In Figs. 5, 6 and 7 we have given the algorithm just for one example construct USD∗.
When USD∗ Construct is called it conducted three pig files call steps: i) call single-step
USD Construct, ii) Based on returned entities of USD construct callWDF ∗ construct, and
iii) Make a union of destination nodes along the path.
The function 1 in Fig. 5 delineates the entire process. Function 1 primarily acts as
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the driver program that iteratively invokes the constituent functions until the completion
condition is met. It can be noted that function 1 can be written as a driver program in the
Map-Reduce framework as well and is preferred, we present it as a shell script to intuitively
represent the flow. We assume that the input file has the following format: source_label,
source_type, destination_label, destination_type, relation_type. We present the algorithm
in terms of USD∗ construct; however, the approach is a generic one and can be applied
to any other construct type. In line 5, we invoke usd.pig, which essentially selects rows
that have the relation USD and have the source that we are interested in making a query
against. This part of the algorithm essentially persists destinations that are reachable via
one hop from the source of interest. Subsequently, in line 8, we prepare for the iterative
self-join phase by cloning the input file. Line number 9 shows the termination condition
for the iteration. Line 12 consists of invoking USD_star.pig with variable inputs. In each
phase of the iteration, we join the original input with the recently computed output, as
shown by the parameters of the pig file. The output of one phase of USD_star.pig is used
as one of the inputs of the next phase of USD_star.pig. Finally in UnionPathUSD.pig, we
combine outputs from usd.pig and USD_star.pig and project distinct destinations that are
reachable. We persist them on HDFS for subsequent usage in the workflow.
Figure 6: Algorithm for Single-step USD Construct.
The function 2 in Fig. 6 calls the single-step USD construct. Here, the “load" command
is used in Pig to load the CSV file of input data. In line 2, “using PigStorage(’,’)" is a syntax
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explaining how data is stored in the file. In this case, it is comma separated. The advantage
of using Pig Latin is that we do not have to store schema at storage time, instead store data
and define schema at loading time. Here “$fileName" is the argument for a name of the file
we provided. In line 3, we use FILTER operator in Pig for selecting records based on the
given predicates. If the predicates are true only then it will proceed through the pipeline.
In this case, we use the filter operation to collect only those entities where starting nodes
match to our given input and check whether their relation is USD or not. In line 4,
FOREACH expression is used to go through a set of expressions and work like projection
operator to send down the new records through the pipeline to next operator. In this case,
we run our FOREACH operator on x, the set of records we retrieved using FILTER, to get
only the destination of the schema. In line 5 and 6, STORE command is used for storing the
data after finishing the data processing. Like LOAD, “using PigStorage(’ ’)" syntax is used
for specifying storage structure of data. In this case, we stored our data into ‘USDoutx/’
folder.
The function 3 in Fig. 7, returns entities of the USD construct by calling WDF ∗ con-
struct. In line 3, here load the data into x and define its schema at load time. In line 4,
filter out only those records where relation is WDF . In line 5, load another set of data in
y for the purpose of Join operation. Here the argument ‘$input$inx’ is controlled by the
shell and each time ‘$inx’ is incremented. In line 6, we filter out only those relations which
are WDF . The reason for doing the filtering first is to try to optimize our query. In line 7,
now, Join both x1 and y1, based on x1’s destination and y1’s source. In line 8, the result of
Join is a new set of transitivity relations, and it is the same schema as original schema out
of those transitive relations. In line 9 and 10, we store our result. One noticeable point is
that all results are stored in one folder’s different files. The reasons are two fold; one is - it
will not expand our big data file even bigger, another one is - this will make error handling
easier.
The function 4 in Fig. 7, make union of destination nodes along the path. In line
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Figure 7: Algorithms for Multi-step USD∗ Construct.
2, a specific directory is provided for loading all the related files from that directory, the
benefits of which are stated before. In line 3, also loads the file from step 1 and where the
value is the destinations. In line 4, this join operation will be performed based on retrieved
nodes in single-step USD construct. Line 5 retrieves all the destination nodes. Line 6 filter
operation retrieves the output nodes of single-step USD construct. In line 7, we only get
destination values here. The union of both values provide complete inferred nodes after
traversing the whole graph is in line 8. In line 9 and 10, the distinct operator has the same
functionality as other distinct operators; and dump operator is responsible for showing the
results.
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3.4 OPQLPig: A Case Study
We now explain our proposed framework and algorithm in terms of a sample query.
For capturing provenance data, we have used UTPB (University of Texas Provenance
Benchmark). Fig. 8 shows a sample provenance graph from the UTPB benchmark that
captured provenance data in PROV-DM format. In this provenance graph, each node is
categorized as entity or activity or agent. The node identifier of this sample provenance
graph is presented in Table. 2. Here, we have 14 Entities, 7 Activities and 1 Agent. We label
each node with its corresponding identifier. Each of these nodes, when connected together,
holds causal dependencies based on PROV-DM model. Each of causal dependencies, such
as entity-entity, entity-activity, entity-agent, activity-agent - has a specific name of these
relations. In Table. 3 we present those relations for Fig. 8 provenance graph.
Table 2: Provenance Graph Nodes and Corresponding Node Identifiers.
Node Type Node Identifier Node Name
Entity en1 Create Table SQL Statements
en2 Create Index SQL Statements
en3 Create Trigger SQL Statements
en4 Schema
en5 Time T1
en6 Dataset
en7 Instance
en8 Time T2
en9 SQL Query
en10 Evaluation Plan
en11 Time T3
en12 Result
en13 Performance Graph
en14 Log
Activity ac1 Create Database Schema
ac2 Load Data
ac3 Record Log
ac4 Optimize Query
ac5 Execute Plan
ac6 Execute Query
ac7 Visualize Performance
Agent ag1 Query Optimizer
OPQLPig can answer any queries presented in UTPB benchmark. Some of the sample
queries are shown in Table. 4.
Based on our sample provenance graph in Fig. 8, the query we choose is:
Find all the Entities ever used along the way for deriving the activity “Optimize
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Figure 8: A Sample Provenance Graph for Provenance Data Capturing [34].
Query"
In order to execute the query and get the result, we have our provenance dataset in
PROV-DM format. To run this query we provide input node ac4 = “Optimize Query".
We execute the driver function which is function 1 in Fig. 5 where prov_data.txt is our
file name and ac4 is our nodeName. To get the query result we use USD* construct. USD*
construct essentially calls three different pig files from Figs. 6 and 7, Function 2, Function
3 and Function 4.
• Call single-step USD Construct and store all the entities associated with given input
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Table 3: Representing Provenance Graph Relations of Fig. 8.
USD WDF WGB WAW
ac1 → en1 en4 → en1 en5 → ac1 ac4 → ag1
ac1 → en2 en4 → en2 en4 → ac1
ac1 → en3 en4 → en3 en8 → ac2
ac3 → en5 en14 → en11 en7 → ac2
ac4 → en4 en7 → en4 en14 → ac3
ac2 → en4 en12 → en4 en10 → ac4
ac6 → en4 en7 → en6 en13 → ac7
ac2 → en6 en14 → en8 en11 → ac5
ac3 → en8 en12 → en10 en12 → ac5
ac4 → en7 en10 → en9 en12 → ac6
ac6 → en7 en13 → en14 en11 → ac6
ac5 → en7 en12 → en9
ac4 → en9
ac6 → en9
ac7 → en3
ac3 → en11
ac5 → en10
Table 4: Some Sample Queries from UTPB Benchmark.
Category Query
Dependencies Find all Entities derivation dependencies in a particular provenance graph.
Find all Activities Informed-by dependencies for a specific provenance graph.
Find all Entity use dependencies for a specific provenance graph.
Find all Activity generation dependencies in a particular provenance graph.
Find all Associated-with dependencies in a particular provenance graph.
Entities Find all Entities and their values, if any, in a particular provenance graph.
Given one Entity and find all Activities that served along the way
Activities Find all Activities and their persistent names, if any, in a particular provenance graph.
Given one Activity and find all Entities that served along the way
nodeName.
• Based on the given provenance graph, store all the entities in the graph which has
WDF relation.
• Conduct the join operation on the returned graph.
• Finally join all the retrieved result along the way.
Now we explain our step by step process and their graphical presentation through
Fig. 9.
3.4.1 Step 1
In our first step, while executing the driver function, we call the single-step USD Con-
struct and retrieve all of the entities associated with given input which is ac4. This execu-
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Figure 9: Graphical Representation of Query Processing Steps.
tion only retrieve the single step nodes with relation USD. Based on our provenance graph
in Fig. 8, we retrieve three relations: ac4 → en4, ac4 → en7 and ac4 → en9. We store all of
the destination nodes en4, en7 and en9 in one designated folder for future reference.
ac4 → en4 ac4 → en7 ac4 → en9
3.4.2 Step 2
Step 2 is the first iteration in the loop of driver function. In this step, we filter out only
those records where relation is WDF. The reason is that, to find out all the entities from
given activities, we need to know all the entity-entity relations in the provenance graph
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too so that later we can do join and find out all the transitive relations in the graph. From
Fig. 8, we have 12 relations with WDF.
en4 → en1 en4 → en2
en4 → en3 en7 → en4
en7 → en6 en10 → en9
en12 → en10 en12 → en9
en14→ en5 en14 → en8
en14→ en11 en13 → en14
3.4.3 Step 3
In step 3, we load the data into variable x and define its schema at load time and load
another set of data in variable y for the purpose of Join operation. The result we found
after Join is a new set of transitivity relations and we make the same schema like original
schema out of those transitive relations. This step iterates until there are no new transitive
relations. If no new transitive relations are generated through iteration then the file size
will not change, and that breaks the loop. The total number of relations are graphically
presented in Fig. 9(c).
en4 → en1 en4 → en2
en4 → en2 en4 → en3
en7 → en4 en7 → en1
en7 → en2 en7 → en3
en7 → en6 en10 → en9
en12 → en10 en12 → en9
en14 → en5 en14 → en8
en14 → en11 en13 → en14
en13 → en5 en13 → en8
en13 → en11
3.4.4 Step 4
Now in step 4, we load all of the transitive relations from step 3 and also load our initial
relations with USD. After the join operation, we have all of the entities ever used along the
way for deriving the activity ac4. The union of all values provides complete inferred nodes
after traversing the whole graph. Here we have 7 relations with 7 entities: en4, en7, en9,
en6, en1, en2 and en3, which used for deriving activity ac4.
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ac4 → en4 ac4 → en7
ac4 → en9 en7 → en6
en4 → en1 en4 → en2
en4 → en3
3.5 Experiments
A collection of experiments were conducted on a machine with Intel core i7− 3612QM
CPU @2.10GHz x 8 processor and 7.7 GB memory running on Ubuntu 12.10 (quantal) 64
bit. The experiments were designed on Apache Pig with version 0.8.1 − cdh3u6 and the
Hadoop framework with version hadoop0.20.2 − cdh3u6. We have captured provenance
using UTPB template. Even though there are 27 different provenance templates rep-
resenting provenance capture from three different workflows, we have chosen just one
particular presentation capturing data from one specific workflow. UTPB was selected as
the benchmark template because it automatically generates datasets with varying sizes.
3.5.1 Data Preparation with benchmark
The original manually created template of PROV-DM contains around 66 triples. It al-
ways makes at least 3 copies of the original template to reach around 200 triples, so it is
easy to get 200, 400 .... 1, 000, 10, 000, etc. triples depending on the needs. However, it
is only the template generator. The data generator takes the “labels" statements and can
change the values to generate different kinds of data, either fixed or randomized. The tem-
plate generator adds a line to connect templates, datasetn was derived from results(n−1),
but this union is very particular to the original template.
There are three main components based on data preparation with the benchmark:
• Original template: This is a provenance graph for one database experiment. It was
created manually [34].
• Template generator: It takes the original template and creates a larger template auto-
matically. The bigger template is the result of cloning the original template multiple
times and connecting clones together into a single graph. Template generator allows
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one to choose any times one would clone her original template and how one would
connect the clones, i.e., sequentially or grid-shape. The file output.prov is generated
by cloning the original template three times. Connections between clones are:
utpb:dataset1 prov:wasDerivedFrom utpb:result0 . and
utpb:dataset2 prov:wasDerivedFrom utpb:result1 .
• Data generator: It takes the original or generated template and generates as many
clones or template instances of the template as specified. This time, each clone rep-
resents a provenance graph for one workflow execution. The data generator ensures
that there are no ID conflicts between template instances.
3.5.2 Performance Study
During our experimental study, we focused on the performance and functionality of
OPQLPig. The experimental data we have gathered were based on the size of big data that
OPQLPig can query and provide the query results. We prepare the data starting with 1000
instances and eventually going to 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000, 7000, 8000, 9000 and 10000
instances for generating big data, therefore testing the feasibility of processing queries by
OPQLPig. Fig. 10 shows the correlation between the size of the instances correspond to
the size of the dataset. As the number of instances increased the size of dataset increases
too. The dataset size of 10, 000 instances is ten times larger than the data size of 1000
instances.
When we run OPQLPig on big dataset of instances then we have to handle large num-
ber of nodes too. The total number of nodes per number of instances are shown in Fig.
11. As the number of instances increases the number of nodes also increases linearly,
which shows the feasibility of our scalable query framework. Also increasing number of
nodes demonstrate increasing number of relationship between those nodes. Fig. 11 de-
picts the correspondence number of nodes with number of relations in specified number
of instances.
We also calculate the average query time of each of OPQLPig construct. Here we
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Figure 10: Dataset Size Vs. Number of Instances.
Figure 11: The Number of Nodes and Relations per Instance in Dataset.
choose multi-step constructs, such as USD* and WGB* construct to see the total query
time required to find the query result. We plot it based on increasing number of nodes
and total query time. We observe from our calculation that the query time doesn’t double
up as the number of nodes increases. This feature shows the feasibility of the OPQLPig
scalable query framework. The average query time for USD* construct is shown in Fig. 12
and average query time for WGB* construct is shown in Fig. 13.
Deployment of a job in Hadoop cluster has many advantages including increased scal-
ability. In other words, using Pig makes it possible to execute queries on large datasets
which are inherently not feasible in single machine solutions. However, deploying a job in
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Hadoop cluster has some overhead including allocating containers for the tasks, deploying
executables, sending data back and forth across machines. Which essentially means that
batch jobs (like pig jobs) on Hadoop and single machine solutions are not comparable
within the same parameter constraints. However, for the sake of completeness, we com-
pare it with OPQL which is single machine solution. We observe that for smaller graphs
it takes relatively longer to process using OPQLPig due to the overhead involved in de-
ploying batch jobs on the cluster. However, with increased data size we do not observe a
significant increase in execution time. This is due to the fact that we are making effective
use of the framework. This scale, however, unattainable in OPQL.
Figure 12: Average Query Time for USD* Construct.
Figure 13: Average Query Time for WGB* Construct.
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3.5.3 Primitive or Built-in Query Constructs in DATAVIEW
Figure 14: DATAVIEW with Primitive Query Construct Workflows.
We used DATAVIEW, a workflow design and configuration system which provides an in-
tuitive GUI for users to design and configure workflow, and for experimenting our queries
[20, 21]. For each provenance construct in PROV-DM model, we created one primitive,
also known as a built-in query construct in DATAVIEW for querying big data. Fig. 14 shows
each of the built-in constructs in there and zoom-in reusable query constructs as a built-in
construct. To summarize the reason for using DATAVIEW is below:
• We support the built-in constructs for the PROV-DM model in DATAVIEW, which es-
sentially provides API for users to take advantage of without dealing with low-level
complexities. These constructs are powerful, yet easy to use.
• The constructs we built in DATAVIEW are reusable and compostable, which provide
users the flexibility to use them alone for simple queries or compose them together
to support more advanced queries.
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• DATAVIEW itself is a scientific workflow system, these provenance captures, and
query constructs also enable the capability of our system.
3.5.4 Executable Query Constructs in DATAVIEW
When the developers develop the primitive construct, it is comparatively effortless and
convenient to built executable query construct. For each built-in or primitive query con-
struct used, needed only the required number of inputs and output. For provenance, based
on primitive construct, any user can create and run executable construct to see the query
results. In Table. 5, we present each of the queries in the UTPB benchmark in DATAVIEW
workflow system by showing the easy creation of executable constructs. In each example
executable construct, the built-in constructs are used. A 2 input data product is shown.
One is our big data file, and another one is text data file which gives the query input. The
result will be saved in an output file. To provide more flexibility to the users, the current
DATAVIEW has integrated Dropbox feature so that users can provide any big data file and
a simple query in the text file; and drag-drop the construct and finally can get the query
result in an output file. The output file is stored in Dropbox and can be accessed in a
Dropbox folder. In this way, end users do not have to deal with the underlying complexity
and can easily obtain query results.
Now we present some composite queries which requires combination of constructs and
also union, intersect, and setdifference operators to get the query results.
• Composite Query 1: Find all the Entities that have common activities and are origi-
nated from entity values X and Y.
The first phase of this query entails unveiling all the tasks that process entities X and
Y. Hence we employ a pair of USD∧ construct associated with X and Y respectively
to obtain the list of downstream tasks. In order to find common activities we input
them into “Intersect" construct. Finally, to obtain the final data products, we pipe the
output of the intersect construct through WGB∧ construct.
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Fig. 15 shows executable construct for getting query result of composite query 1.
Figure 15: DATAVIEW Query Execution for Composite Query 1.
• Composite Query 2: Find all the Entities except entity X and Y such that they are
generated by entity Z.
The query identifies source entities for entity Z, we start by extracting all the ac-
tivities that generates entity Z. In order to obtain the activities, we employ WGB∗
construct which pipes into USD∗ construct, which results in set of source entities
that get transformed into Z. However, since we are interested in filtering out X and
Y entities, we first do “Union" operation of both X and Y, then make use of “SetD-
ifference" construct to filter out X and Y entities from entities we get from USD∗
construct. The output of “SetDifference" construct gives us the final set of entities.
Fig. 16 shows executable construct for getting query result of composite query 2.
• Composite Query 3: Find union of all the entities that were generated via a set of
common activities either via entities X and Y or via entities P or Q.
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Figure 16: DATAVIEW Query Execution for Composite Query 2.
This query is an extension of query 1. Here we replicate query 1 twice to obtain all
the entities that have a common activity. In first phase we employ a pair of USD∧
construct associated with X and Y respectively to obtain the list of activities, then to
find commom activities we input them to “Intersect" construct. We pipe the output
of this construct to WGB∧ construct to obtain the entities. We perform the same set
of operations by providing the initial entities P and Q, instead of X and Y . Finally,
we pipe both output through “Union" construct for our final result.
Fig. 17 shows executable construct for getting query result of composite query 3.
• Composite Query 4: Find union of all source entities that generated all entities at-
tributed to scientists X and Y.
In the first phase of this query we identify the data products that are attributed
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Figure 17: DATAVIEW Query Execution for Composite Query 3.
to scientists X and Y, and we employ 2 WAT∧ construct for that purpose, one for
scientist X and another one is for scientist Y . The output of both WAT∧ construct
then pipe via WGB∗ to identify the upstream activities. Subsequently, the output of
this phase of the query is piped into USD∗ to extract the input data products. Lastly,
a “Union" construct is instrumented to combine input entities for scientists X and Y .
Fig. 18 shows executable construct for getting query result of composite query 4.
• Composite Query 5: Find all common source entities that generated all entities at-
tributed by scientists X and Y.
To find all common source entities, we first identify the data products that are at-
tributed to scientists X and Y , and employ WAT∧ for that purpose. Then we iden-
tify the upstream activities viaWGB∗ and output of this phase is piped into USD∗ to
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Figure 18: DATAVIEW Query Execution for Composite Query 4.
extract the input entities. Finally, “Intersect" construct finds out only common source
entities for both scientists X and Y .
Fig. 19 shows executable construct for getting query result of composite query 5.
As shown in Fig. 20, we executed composite queries on our cluster to benchmark their
performance. We noticed that for query 1, since it contains a chain of single step queries,
gets executed relatively faster than other queries. This is comparable to query 3, which
is also a chain of single step query. Queries 2, 4 and 5, however, chain together, multiple
multi-step queries, which in turn spawn multiple map-reduce jobs. Hence these queries
are more expensive. In hadoop ecosystem, mappers and reducers, which are full fledged
programs are spawned on the system and data are shuffled across nodes. Hence, bootstrap-
ping a job in the cluster takes time. This bootstrap time overhead, may seem significant
when the data size is relatively small. However, the bigger the data size becomes, more
negligible the overhead becomes and full potential of the cluster becomes noticeable.
51
Figure 19: DATAVIEW Query Execution for Composite Query 5.
Figure 20: DATAVIEW execution time for Composite Queries.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we reported the OPQLPig query language, extending OPQL for large
datasets by implementing the translation operation of OPQL to Pig Latin data flow lan-
guage with elongated features to make the query language scalable, robust, reliable and
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parallel for working on top of Hadoop Distributed File System. This query language rel-
ishes the MapReduce model without reinventing common functionality such as join, filter
and so on. Based on the graph pattern, provenance graph algebra and syntax-semantics of
single-step-edge-forward and Multi-step-edge constructs, the OPQLPig translation covers
every scenario.
In the future, we would like to expand our research in three major directions. First,
we plan to extend our query language, so that it can read input from and write output to
sources other than HDFS, for example from NoSQL Databases like HBase or Cassandra.
Second, we plan to focus on optimization issues in OPQLPig query language and conduct
the experimental study based on current system and NoSQL database techniques. Finally,
we will makeOPQLPig applicable to other queries such as sub-graph isomorphism, pattern
matching, and shortest path.
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Table 5: The Result of each UTPB Query in DATAVIEW.
Query Graphical Query Execution
Find all Entities of a Provenance Graph
Find all Activities of a Provenance Graph
Given one Entity to Find all Activities of a Provenance Graph
Given one Activity to Find all Entities of a Provenance Graph
Find Association-with dependencies for a Activity
Find the Entity Used dependencies for a Activity
Find the Activity Generation dependencies for a Entity
Find the Entity Derivation dependencies for a Entity
Find the Activity Informed-by dependencies for a Activity
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CHAPTER 4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN PROVENANCE
In Scientific workflow Provenance system, a successful collaboration of information and
resources are required. For secure and flexible adaptation of different environments, ade-
quate access control policies are fundamentally imperative. Data products and derivation
history are essential for recomputing scientific results, and effective access control mecha-
nism are indispensable for all the sensitive data and processes. In this chapter, we do the
following 1) Propose a role-based access control model for scientific workflow provenance;
2) Define three quality requirements for scientific workflow provenance access control poli-
cies - consistency, completeness, and conciseness, 3) Provide a mapping from specifications
over workflows to their counterparts on provenance that preserves the quality properties,
and 4) Provide a case study on a scientific workflow for autism behavioral data analysis to
show the feasibility of our proposed analysis algorithms.
4.1 Introduction
Security in provenance is an important research topic in a scientific workflow system.
Provenance systems must adhere to the same security and access control protocol that
the workflow system supports and maintains, otherwise sensitive data and access pattern
might be susceptible to vulnerability. There has been a great deal of research on capturing,
managing and using workflow provenance information, but for shared public and scientific
data little progress has been made on defining provenance security.
Sensitive data, lineage and traces inherently necessitate access control and access privi-
lege agnostic, globally accessible view of provenance makes scientific workflows vulnarable
to security breach. Thus, to comply with the inherent workflow security protocol, prove-
nance systems need to maintain a different view of information for different roles based
on the privilege associated with it.
In the combination of security and provenance, we have to consider the following
scenarios. Cases where security and access control is not of concern in the workflow,
provenance security need not be any more restrictive than the parent workflow. However, a
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less rigorous access control in the provenance specification makes the security protocol for
the workflow less efficient. Hence, provenance specification must provide a variable view
as it pertains to the workflow to the user based on the security protocol. While decoupling
the security specification for provenance may seem more flexible, it introduces additional
complexity in the system. In this chapter, we delineate how provenance specifications
can inherit security protocols of the parent workflow and adhere to the same level of
guarantees.
Scientific workflows and their applications have been monumental in many industries,
especially in health informatics. Health informatics, however, have a unique data privacy
requirement, access to data has to be strictly enforced and monitored. With the implemen-
tation of HIPPA, it has become imperative that scientific workflows and their provenance
management systems adhere to strict role-based access control protocol. If we model a
scientific workflow and its provenance as two distinct DAGs, each of the nodes and edges
need to be augmented with access control requirement. Moreover, all of these constituent
components should maintain a user and role-specific access control ensure compliance.
Traditionally analysis of access control policies have limitations that they are not able
to incorporate the dynamic execution of workflow information into account.
4.1.1 Security in Workflow vs. security in Provenance
Since scientific workflow captures the intellectual property of scientific experiments
and composition of various computational services into the workflow, security in workflow
protects the access to those workflow tasks and data to provide access control to those
crucial scientific results. There can be different scenarios in perspective of providing access
control policies in the workflow, for example, based on scientist’s preferences one can only
publish source data and final scientific results, but not the scientific workflow altogether.
Whereas, for other scientist’s they can publish source data, scientific results and all the
workflow used there, but keep the parameter setting as a secret for the workflow.
The security in provenance is an important aspect in the scientific workflow. As prove-
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nance captures all the derivation history including original data sources, intermediary data
products and all the steps involved to produce those data products. Imposing security
means implementing access control policies on those data products(source, intermediary,
final) and the dependencies among them. Provenance access control policies can be ap-
plied and can release provenance information of source data, scientific results, and param-
eter setting. They still can hide an intellectual property of certain provenance information.
Access control policies can be applied to composite tasks or sub-workflows of prove-
nance or at different abstraction levels, where users are only allowed to access provenance
information based on their requirements and preferences. In provenance security, there are
no foundational models yet, to define and relate security goals such as availability, con-
fidentiality, and privacy. For making meaningful progress on these issues, a foundational
model will be outlined and developed.
4.1.2 Examples for Importance of Provenance Security
• Without proper provenance or in circumstances of provenance failure, information
could be misinterpreted. An old news article can bring misinterpretation when the
date of information is not stored and can tie up with sudden economic loss[38].
• For the scientist, any lack of information makes it difficult for reviewers to evaluate
contributions of the authors. Keeping provenance of those scientific discoveries aim
to help to keep transparency and repeatability [38].
• Unintentional provenance information can violate privacy and confidentiality too.
One example from [38] is: The government documents published in word version,
has a tremendous risk of privacy and confidentiality.
• At the end of the process of peer-review, the content of the reviews are delivered to
the authors, but the identity of the reviewers are not delivered. Here the reviews
(data) are public, but who wrote the review (provenance) is confidential.
• In the letter of recommendation, the subject of the letter is not allowed to know
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the content, but allowed to know the author. Here the content of letter (data) is
confidential, but the author of the letter (provenance) is public.
Figure 21: Autism Workflow.
Figure 22: Provenance of Autism Workflow.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 defines basic terminologies
of the security framework. Section 4.3 of access control policies for workflow provenance
system. Section 4.4 presents a formal security scientific workflow specification for task,
port and data channel with proposed algorithms of access control policies. Section 4.5
formalizes a mapping between workflow to security view and presents security view for
provenance. The analysis of those policies in perspective of policy quality requirements
to find out these evolving policies are consistent, complete, and concise is presented in
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Section 4.6. This section provides proof of the maintenance of policy quality requirements
for provenance. Section 4.7 modifies the policies based on quality requirements. Section
4.8 presents prototype and provides an example from the Autism community to show the
validity of our quality of access control policies for provenance.
4.2 Provenance security framework
For a provenance security framework, formal and precise security properties like con-
fidentiality, privacy, and availability are needed for enforcing suitable and desired security
policy are desirable.
In the era of big data, scientific workflows have become essential to automate scientific
experiments and guarantee repeatability. Increasingly in many scientific domains such as
health and medication, personalization in information processing has become key to suc-
cess. Hence, access control protocols in scientific workflows have become a prerequisite.
Workflow provenance systems, while makes managing data and process lineage possi-
ble, also need to adhere to the access control protocol inherent in the scientific workflows.
Here, we propose a security scientific workflow specification with role-based access control
policy and demonstrate how the policy is inherited by the workflow provenance system.
We characterize the desirable properties of role-based access control protocol in scientific
workflows and delineate how the properties are maintained in the workflow provenance
systems as well.
The concept is illustrated with an example from health informatics. In such an appli-
cation secure communication in scientific workflow plays an imperative part for Autism
Spectrum Disorder. In [20], an autism workflow system has been created for analyzing,
predicting, classifying and mining big pool of autism data. From the security perspective,
accessing and analyzing these sensitive data should be handled based on a particular set
of users for a particular role. For this reason, we need a provenance security framework
to allow permission for specific task and data products for specific roles. Ideally, in the
Autism community, parents can have full access to all the diagnosis data which includes
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medical, therapeutic, school and other information. But, for the school district, teachers by
default do not have privileges to see child’s medical details unless explicitly granted by the
parents. Similarly, therapists could have access to certain sensitive part of the workflow,
but not all. For implementing a secure communication of workflow in autism community
a security framework is needed.
Below we define the basic PROV-DM provenance graph and access control policy.
Definition 4.1 (Provenance Graph). A provenance graph PG = (N, E) consists of:
• a set of nodes N = EN
⋃
AC
⋃
AG, where EN is a set of entities, AC is a set of
activities, and AG is a set of agents, based on the PROV-DM model.
• a set of directed edges E = Eu
⋃
Eg
⋃
Ed
⋃
Ei
⋃
Ea
⋃
Eab
⋃
Eat
where i) Eu ⊆ AC × EN and (ac, en) ∈ Eu means that activity ac used entity en.
ii) Eg ⊆ EN × AC and (en, ac) ∈ Eg means that entity en was generated by activity ac.
iii) Ed ⊆ EN × EN and (en1, en2) ∈ Ed means that entity en1 was derived from entity
en2.
iv) Ei ⊆ AC × AC and (ac1, ac2) ∈ Ei means that activity ac1 was informed by activity
ac2.
v) Ea ⊆ AC × AG and (ac, ag) ∈ Ea means that activity ac was associated with agent
ag.
vi) Eab ⊆ AG × AG and (ag1, ag2) ∈ Eab means that agent ag1 acted on behalf of agent
ag2.
vii) Eat ⊆ EN × AG and (en, ag) ∈ Eat means that entity en was attributed to agent
ag.
Definition 4.2 (Role Based Access Control). Let Role-Based Access control Rˆ for provenance
security be defined as a tuple ( U, R, A, W, E, φ, µ ), where
• U is a set of users;
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• R is a set of roles;
• A is a set of actions;
• W is a workflow;
• E is the set of elements in workflow W including all the tasks, ports, and data channels.
• φ: R × E × A → {0, 1} is a function that maps permissions for roles, elements, and
actions to 0 or 1. Here, 0 denotes restricted access and 1 denotes full access.
• µ: U → R is a function that maps users to their roles.
The function φ is further defined as:
φ(e, r, α) =


Γ(e, r, α), if e is a task (4.1a)
ρ(e, r, α), if e is a port (4.1b)
δ(p1, p2, r, α), if (p1, p2) is a data channel (4.1c)
For the function φ the element could be either task, port or data channel. For task we
define the function Γ, for the port we define the function ρ and for the data channel, we
define the function δ. The functions Γ, ρ and δ are defined in the following sections.
4.3 Provenance Security Policy Life Span
The provenance security policy life cycle is composed of four iterative stages: i) Security
policy specification, ii) Security policy enforcement, iii) Security policy analysis, and iv)
Security policy evaluation. The administrator of access control policies coordinates with
the system users and determines the policies to be enforced in either or all task, port and
data channel level. In security policy enforcement stage, based on system users access on
protected elements, the policies are applied to either grant or restrict access. In correspon-
dence to context or environment of the application, the policies evolve to adopt correlated
changes. In policy analysis, policy quality requirements are analyzed. This phase analyzes
the policy qualities like consistency, completeness, conciseness to make sure the proposed
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policies adhere to all those qualities. Finally, in policy evaluation, we evaluate quality re-
quirements and identify any quality discrepancy and modifies those policies based on the
identified discrepancy in policies. Fig. 23 shows a graphical representation of provenance
security policy lifespan.
Figure 23: Provenance Security Policy Life Span.
4.4 Security Policy Specification
4.4.1 Task Level Specification
Definition 4.3 (Task Annotation). A task level specification is denoted by Γ: T × R × A →
{0, 1} that maps specific user and tasks to the permission level and is defined by:
Γ(t, r, α) =


Invalid, if Π(t, r, α) = 1 and Γ(tp, r, α) = 0 (4.2a)
Π(t, r, α), if Π(t, r, α) 6= −1 (4.2b)
Γ(tp, r, α), tp is not null and Π(t, r, α) 6= −1 (4.2c)
Invalid, tp is null and Π(t, r, α) 6= −1 (4.2d)
In task specification, the access permission can be annotated by 0 or 1. Here we define
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a function Π: R×E ×A→ {0, 1,−1}, that returns permission of role, element, and action
triplet. If it returns -1, it means there is no explicit specification for (t, r, α); otherwise, it
return the explicit annotation for the triple (t, r, α).
If the permission is not explicitly specified in RBAC then child task t can inherit permis-
sion from task tp, here tp denotes parent of t, α ∈ A, r ∈ R. In other words, the task level
security specification, if explicitly stated, is validated against consistency requirement of
the protocol. In this case, if the parent task does not have security access, the child task
inherits the restriction, and this restriction cannot be overridden by explicit specification.
One important feature of the task is that when it is annotated as 1 then all other task,
ports or data channels contained in task T should be accessible otherwise a 0 annotation is
explicitly specified or derived from them.
Our definition captures the inconsistency specification between a task and any of its
ancestors while [36] only captures the inconsistency specification between a task and its
parent task; parent(t) the task that immediately contains task t.
Here we have 4 cases:
• Case a: If the parent task differs with the child task in question in terms of access
control permission such that the parent task does not have access yet, the child task
has explicit specification to have secure access, this will result in inconsistency in
access control protocol.
• Case b: If the task in question has access control protocol explicitly specified then
this will override ancestral access control protocols.
• Case c: If the current task does not have explicit specification but has a valid parent
then it will inherit it’s parent’s access control privileges.
• Case d: Lastly, if the current task does not have a valid parent and valid specification,
an exception will be thrown.
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The permission specification can be calculated using function “FindTaskSpec" in Algo-
rithm.
Figure 24: Task Level Security Specification.
4.4.2 Port Level Specification
Definition 4.4 (Port Annotation). A port level specification is denoted by ρ: P × R × A →
{0, 1} that maps specific role and ports to the permission level and is defined by:
ρ(p, r, α) =


Invalid, if Π(p, r, α) = 1 and Γ(tp, r, α) = 0 (4.3a)
Π(p, r, α), if Π(p, r, α) 6= −1 (4.3b)
Γ(tp, r, α), otherwise (4.3c)
Ports can be specified with 0 or 1. In the Port level specification, when any port has no
specified security specification, then that inherits either access or denied permission from
owning task. The administrator can explicitly specify all or some ports access permissions.
For all workflow run, the port annotation 1 or 0 specified for any given task, demonstrate
the accessibility of data product.
Here we have 3 cases:
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• Case a: If the parent task does not have access permission, but the port contained
in that task has explicit specification to have secure access, then this will result in
invalid access control protocol.
• Case b: If the port in question has access control protocol explicitly specified then
this will override ancestral access control protocols.
• Case c: If the port does not have explicit specification but it’s containing task has
access control specified then it will inherit the task’s access control privileges.
Here, tp denote the owner task of port p.
In appearance, our port-level security specification is the same as [36], but it improves
the inconsistency specification check due to the improvement of task-level security specifi-
cation, which affects the result of port-level specification inconsistency check.
Our port-level specification is greatly simplified from our previous definition as we do
not allow the accessibility of a data channel when its respective ports are not accessible.
The annotation of port is calculated by function “FindPortSpec" in Algorithm.
Figure 25: Port Level Security Specification.
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4.4.3 Data Channel Level Specification
Definition 4.5 (Data Channel Annotation). A data channel level specification is denoted by
δ: P × R × A→ {0, 1} that maps specific roles and ports to the permission level and is defined
by:
δ(p1, p2, r, α) =
{
ρ(p1, r, α), if ρ(p1, r, α) = ρ(p2,r, α) (4.4a)
Invalid Otherwise (4.4b)
The Data Channel specification is quite straight-forward. When both ports have access
permission, then data channel must have access permission. When both ports permission
is denied, the data channel’s permission is denied too.
Our definition greatly simplified the specification effort at a small cost of not allowing
the specification of data dependency without the accessibility of respective ports, which
has a very rare use case in practice.
The permission specification can be calculated using function “FindDataChannelSpec"
in Algorithm.
Figure 26: Data Channel Level Security Specification.
4.5 Security Policy Enforcement
In security policy enforcement, provenance systems can maintain a different view of
information for different roles and enforce associated privileges.
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We define security provenance view as a restricted view of a provenance only consisting
of that information that users are authorized to access. To illustrate this view in PROV-DM
model we graphically represent the provenance model relation “Used" in Fig. 27 and
“wasGeneratedBy" in Fig. 28 and corresponding mapping from workflow to provenance.
Table. 6 shows the specification mapping from workflow to provenance.
Let E be the elements in a workflow consisting of tasks, ports and data channel and
let Ψ be a mapping function Ψ : E → N that maps elements in the workflow to their
corresponding nodes in the provenance graph. The inverse function Ψ−1 : N → E returns
the reverse mapping.
We also introduce the following two notations, Let ℑ : E → E be a function defined as
follows:
ℑ(e) =
{
e, if e is task (4.5a)
tp, if e is port, tp is container task. (4.5b)
Let ℘ : E → E be a function defined as follows:
℘(e) =
{
e, if e is port (4.6a)
{pe}, if e is task, {pe} are ports of e. (4.6b)
Definition 4.6 (Security Provenance View of Used Relation).
Figure 27: Provenance Security in USED Relation.
• Γ(Ψ(tw),r,view) = Γ(tw,r,view)
• ∆(Ψ(Pw),r,view) = ρ(Pw,r,view)
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• ζ(edge (Ψ(tw), Ψ(Pw)), r, view) = Γ(tw,r,view)
Definition 4.7 (Security Provenance View of wasGeneratedBy Relation).
Figure 28: Provenance Security in wasGeneratedBy Relation.
• Γ(Ψ(tw),r,view) = Γ(tw,r,view)
• ∆(Ψ(Pw),r,view) = ρ(Pw,r,view)
• ζ(edge (Ψ(Pw), Ψ(tw)), r, view) = Γ(tw,r,view)
Table 6: RBAC Security Specification for “Used" and “wasGeneratedBy" Relation.
Workflow RBAC Provenance RBAC
Task Port Task Data Product Relation
+ - + - +
+ + + + +
- - - - -
- + INVALID
We illustrate security policy requirements based on Autism provenance system in 22
and defines those access control policies in Table 7.
4.6 Security Policy Quality Requirements and Analysis
We define and illustrate our security policy quality requirements below:
4.6.1 Consistency
acpi and acpj are consistent if and only if
68
Table 7: Role Based Access Control Policy for Provenance System.
Access Control Role Permission
Policy Element Action Sign
acp1 Parents T1 Read +
acp2 i1 Read +
acp3 T2 Read +
acp4 i2 Read +
acp5 T4 Read +
acp6 i5 Read +
acp7 T9 Read +
acp8 O10 Read +
acp9 Teachers i1 Read +
acp10 T2 Read +
acp11 i2 Read −
acp12 O1 Read +
acp13 O2 Read +
acp14 O6 Read −
acp15 i9 Read +
acp16 O10 Read +
acp17 Therapist T1 Read +
acp18 i1 Read +
acp19 T2 Read +
acp20 i2 Read +
acp21 T4 Read +
acp22 T5 Read +
acp23 T9 Read +
acp24 T10 Read +
acp25 O10 Read +
acpi.u = acpj.u, ∧ µ(acpi.u) = µ(acpj.u) ∧ acpi.e = acpj.e, ∧ acpi.a = acpj.a =⇒
φ(µ(acpi.u),e,a) = φ(µ(acpj.u),e,a),
∀ u ∈ U, ∀ e ∈ E, ∀ a ∈ A
Here we refer consistency between two policies acpi and acpj where for the same user
with the same role, same element, and activity, both policies should have the same access
rights. If one policy allows access implies another policy allows access too. If there is
any inconsistency in policy, that requires conflict resolution which can be minimized with
consistent policies.
Example 1: As shown in Table. 7, for teachers role, acp14 and acp15 are not consistent.
Based on our specification an access control policy, both policies need to have the same
access rights when they have the same role, user, element, and activity. Here acp14 and
acp15 do not meet that criteria. They are inconsistent because one port is specified as
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negative access whereas at another end of data channel another port specified as positive
access. In 7, for a single data channel the output port O6 specified negative and the input
port i9 specified positive. From our Port level specification algorithm, both ports should
have same permission. In this case, the output and the input port of single data channel
have different permissions. Therefore, this is inconsistency in policy. We can correct this
inconsistency in policy evolution phase.
4.6.2 Completeness
Any access control policy acpi is complete if and only if
∀ i, µ(acpi.u) is defined ∧ φ(µ(acpi.u),e,α) is defined;
where ∃ u ∈ U, ∃ e ∈ E, ∃ α ∈ A
Completeness of an access control policy is where for any roles access control policy is
defined. A complete access control policy has both role defined and access policy defined.
An incomplete policy has either role undefined or access policy for task/port undefined.
Example 2: In Table. 7, there is no access control policy for teachers role for allowing
or denying access to Family History table dataset of Task T4. Without setting up the access
control policy for input i5 or task T4 the policy defined accessing or denying the information
of family history is incomplete.
4.6.3 Conciseness
An access control policy acpi ∈ Rˆ is concise if and only if;
∃ acpj ∈ Rˆ ∧ µ(acpi.u) = µ(acpj.u),
∧ acpi.e = acpj .e, ∧ acpi.a = acpj .a,
∧ φ(µ(acpi.u),e,a) = φ(µ(acpj.u),e,a) =⇒ i = j ;
∀ u ∈ U, ∀ e ∈ E, ∀ a ∈ A.
The conciseness of access control policy means that for any policy if the role are the
same, element same, the actions are the same, permissions are the same that means those
implies to the same policy. If there are two access control policies acpi and acpj, where
both policies have the same role, same user, same element and same activity, but defined
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as two different policies then we refer these two policies are not concise or redundant.
Example 3: Based on access control policies in Table. 7, acp23 and acp24 are not concise.
From task specification, we know that when the parent task’s accessibility is positive then
child task’s accessibility is positive too unless otherwise stated. We do not have to specify
both cases here.
Theorem 1. If RBAC is in WFRBAC is consistent, then RBAC in Provenance ProvRBAC is
consistent as well.
Proof. Lets assume that WFRBAC is consistent and ProvRBAC is not consistent.
From the definition we know WFRBAC consistent if and only if i 6= j ∧ acpi.r = acpj.r ∧
acpi.e = acpj .e ∧ acpi.a = acpj.a Implies φ(acpi.r, acpi.e, acpi.a) = φ(acpj.r, acpj .e, acpj .a).
If ProvRBAC is inconsistent then one or more of the following is true:
Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)), acpi.r, acpi.a) 6= Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)), acpj .r, acpj .a) or
ρ(Ψ(℘(acpi.e)), acpi.r, acpi.a) 6= ρ(Ψ(℘(acpj.e)), acpj .r, acpj .a) or
ζ(edge(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)),Ψ(℘(acpi.e))), acpi.r, acpi.a) 6= ζ(edge(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)),Ψ(℘(acpj.e)), acpj .r, acpj .a)
However, Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)), acpi.r, acpi.a) = Γ(ℑ(acpi.e), acpi.r, acpi.a) and
Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)), acpj .r, acpj .a) = Γ(ℑ(acpj .e), acpj.r, acpj .a).
Again since,
φ(acpi.r, ℑ(acpi.e), acpi.a) = φ(acpj.r, ℑ(acpj .e), acpj .a),
We can conclude,
Γ(ℑ(acpi.e), acpi.r, acpi.a) = Γ(ℑ(acpj .e), acpj.r, acpj .a).
Hence,
Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)), acpi.r, acpi.a) = Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)), acpj .r, acpj .a).
Similarly, we can show that,
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ρ(Ψ(℘(acpi.e)), acpi.r, acpi.a) = ρ(Ψ(℘(acpj.e)), acpj .r, acpj .a).
Lastly, since,
ζ(edge(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)),Ψ(℘(acpi.e))), acpi.r, acpi.a) = Γ(ℑ(acpi.e), acpi.r, acpi.a)
and ζ(edge(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e),Ψ(℘(acpj.e)), acpj .r, acpj .a) = Γ(ℑ(acpj .e), acpj.r, acpj .a) and
Γ(ℑ(acpi.e), acpi.r, acpi.a) = Γ(ℑ(acpj .e), acpj.r, acpj .a),
We can conclude that
ζ(edge(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)),Ψ(℘(acpi.e)), acpi.r, acpi.a)= ζ(edge(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)),Ψ(℘(acpj .e))), acpj.r, acpj .a).
So, ProvRBAC cannot be inconsistent.
Theorem 2. If RBAC is in WFRBAC is complete, then RBAC in Provenance ProvRBAC is
complete as well.
Proof. An access control policy acpi is complete if and only if µ(acpi.u) is defined ∧ φ(µ(acpi.u),
acpi.e,α) is defined ∀ u ∈ U, ∀ e ∈ E, ∀ α ∈ A.
Again, since we are assuming that RBAC in ProvRBAC is incomplete:
• Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)),r,view) is undefined)
∨ ∆(Ψ(℘(acpi.e)),r,view) is undefined
∨ ζ(edge (Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)), Ψ(℘(acpi.e))), r, view) is undefined.
However, since,
• Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)),r,view) = Γ(ℑ(acpi.e),r,view)
• ∆(Ψ(℘(acpi.e)),r,view) = ρ(℘(acpi.e),r,view)
• ζ(edge (Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)), Ψ(℘(acpi.e))), r, view) = Γ(acpi.e,r,view)
and Γ(ℑ(acpi.e),r,view), ρ(℘(acpi.e),r,view) and Γ(acpi.e,r,view) are defined.
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Hence Prov(RBAC) cannot be incomplete.
Theorem 3. If RBAC is inWFRBAC is concise, then RBAC in Provenance ProvRBAC is concise
as well.
Proof. Since, RBAC inWFRBAC is concise, we get if ∃ acpi, acpj ∈ Rˆ such that:
µ(acpi.u) = µ(acpj.u), ∧ acpi.e = acpj .e, ∧ acpi.a = acpj.a, ∧ φ(acpi.r, acpi.e, acpi.a) =
φ(acpj.r, acpj .e, acpj.a) ∧ i = j; where ∀ u ∈ U, ∀ e ∈ E, ∀ a ∈ A.
Since we are assuming that RBAC in ProvRBAC is redundant, it implies:
• Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)),r,view) = Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)),r,view) and
• ∆(Ψ(℘(acpi.e)),r,view) = ∆(Ψ(℘(acpj .e)),r,view) and
• ζ(edge (Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)), Ψ(℘(acpi.e))), r, view) = ζ(edge (Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)), Ψ(℘(acpj .e))),
r, view) and
• i 6= j
However, from the definition we know:
• Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpi.e)),r,view) = Γ(ℑ(acpi.e),r,view)
• ∆(Ψ(℘(acpi.e),r,view) = ρ(℘(acpi.e),r,view)
And
• Γ(Ψ(ℑ(acpj.e)),r,view) = Γ(ℑ(acpj.e),r,view)
• ∆(Ψ(℘(acpj.e),r,view) = ρ(℘(acpj.e),r,view)
And since Γ(ℑ(acpi.e),r,view) = Γ(ℑ(acpj.e),r,view) and
ρ(℘(acpi.e),r,view) = ρ(℘(acpj.e),r,view),
it implies that i = j.
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Hence, RBAC in ProvRBAC should be concise as well.
4.7 Security Policy Evolution
Security policy Evolution phase is needed for the modification of policies based on
quality analysis phase after finding all the inconsistent, incomplete and redundant policies.
The administrator retains the right to do the modification after finding those incorrect
policies. For instance, inconsistent policies in Table. 7, for the role of teachers policy
acp14 and acp15, are inconsistent because the ports in data channel are specified with two
different permission. For a single data channel, the output port O6 specified negative and
the input port i9 specified positive. From our Port level and data channel level specification
algorithms, both ports should have same permission. In this case, the output and the input
port of single data channel have different permission, in evolution phase, the administrator
will do the modification and specify explicitly both ports O6 and i9 are negative. For
incomplete policies like the one in the example, when no access control policy for teachers
role is specified for allowing or denying access to Family History table dataset of Task
T4, a policy evolution is needed. Without setting up the access control policy for input
i5 or task T4 the policy defined accessing or denying the information of family history is
incomplete. For that, the administrator modifies the policies by adding an access right
for Task T4 or input i5. For redundant policies like acp23 and acp24, the administrator can
remove the policy acp24 because when the parent task’s accessibility is positive, the child
task’s accessibility is positive as well unless otherwise stated.
4.8 ProvSec Prototype and Services
We developed a ProvSec prototype to validate the effectiveness of our protocol, with
workflow view and mapped provenance views, in DATAVIEW. We specified our security
in workflow and mapped that security to provenance, based on the role of the user. The
security view of provenance does not have to be a connected graph. The reason is that
security is imposed based on corresponding roles. Therefore the dependencies between
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the subgraphs are hidden. In DATAVIEW system, Provenance Manager is the key to man-
age scientific workflow provenance. ProvSec prototype is managed by the provenance
manager.
We illustrate our workflow provenance security mechanism with a real-life example
by collecting data from SFARI project about Autism Spectrum Disorder(ASD). The autism
workflow created in DATAVIEW [21, 20] system is used here. This running workflow
system has ten tasks. The workflow in Fig. 21 explores all of the unique attributes of
each child’s Family history, education history, and medical history and identify predictive
features pertaining to each individual child. This workflow implements data mining tech-
niques for predicting the outcome based on the features availability. Both tasks T1 and T2
perform Projection p-workflow, which projects the predominant attributes out of a pool of
attributes. Based on the SFARI id the task T3 then performs another p-workflow task, the
Natural Join operation. Task T4 performs Projection on SFARI’s follow-up Family history
dataset. The retrieved result of both task T3 and T4, T5, natural join operation is performed.
Task T6 checks to see if there are any missing or null values in a retrieved data set. Then
Task T7 performs another Projection operation. The output of this task works as an input
of task T8 which then converts CSV files to ARFF file format. The final result predictive
dataset retrieved by executing data mining task T10. For data mining and predicting, a
test dataset is required, and that test dataset is provided to task T9 for converting to ARFF
format. After cumulating train set, test test and sample number of tree parameter we get
the final prediction result. After executing this workflow in Fig. 22 we illustrated most
detailed workflow run provenance information. In Fig. 22, circles represent data products,
and rectangles represent workflow task run. The edge between data products and tasks
are relations. For example, an edge from data product to task is called “wasGeneratedBy"
relation, and an edge from task to data product is call “used" relation.
We use ProvSec prototype for autism workflow with the defined and modified policies.
Based on each role we can see a security view of provenance by imposing defined policies.
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Figure 29: Workflow Permission for Teachers in Autism Provenance System.
Figure 30: Security View of Teachers in Autism Provenance System.
Figure 31: Workflow Permission for Therapists in Autism Provenance System.
Because of the sensitive nature of an autism workflow, we propose the restriction on
data product and their provenance information for different roles. In ProvSec we defined
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Figure 32: Security View of Therapists in Autism Provenance System.
3 types of the role for autism workflow.
• Parent’s access permission specification and representing provenance security view
• Teacher’s access permission specification and representing provenance security view
• Therapist’s access permission specification and representing provenance security view
The parents have access permission to all the tasks, ports and data channels. For the
parent role, in the provenance security view, parents can see all the sensitive data products
and their corresponding relations. In addition to input and output data product, they can
have access to all of the intermediary data products and can provide test set of data for
projecting output.
For the teacher role, teacher or educators can have access to everything except Medical
input data product i2, the projected output O2 of the data product, Family history input
data i5. When any data channel in a workflow is specified as negative then the data product
generated for the provenance is not allowed to be seen by users. Any negative annotation
on ports implies merely that the generated data product should not be visible to users of
that particular role. Fig. 29 shows the workflow permission for teachers and Fig. 30 shows
the security provenance view for teachers.
For the Therapist role, all therapist or clinician can have access to initial raw data to
know about ASD children and prototyping appropriate program. This role doesn’t require
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to access intermediate data products or relations. However, they have permission to view
predicted output for provided input parameters.
Fig. 31 shows the workflow permission for therapist and Fig. 32 shows the security
provenance view for them, after implementing all the modified policies.
4.8.1 Performance Study
A collection of experiments were conducted on a machine with Intel core i7− 3612QM
CPU @2.10GHz x 8 processor and 7.7 GB memory.
Figure 33: The Average Time to Generate Provenance Access Control Policies.
In Figure 33, we plot the time taken to inherit workflow specific access control pro-
tocol by the provenance system. We can observe that the inheritance process is not time
intensive and can be computed very fast. We also observe a linear relationship between
the number of access control protocols in the scientific workflow system and the time it
takes to execute translation process. For example for a scientific workflow with 10, 20,
30, 40, 50, etc. access control protocols specified, it takes 5, 19, 17, 43, 57 milliseconds
respectively.
4.9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we studied access control policies for data products and their derivation
history for protecting sensitive data and processes. First, we formalized a security scientific
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workflow specification for task, port and data channel with proposed algorithms of access
control policies. Second, we analyze those policies in terms of the policy quality require-
ments. Third, we formalized a security view of provenance based upon a mapping between
workflow and provenance. Forth, we provide proof of holding policy quality requirements
for provenance. Lastly, we evaluated an example in Autism community in order to show
the validity of our quality of access control policies for provenance.
In the future, we will consider conducting security case studies with more complex data
patterns and integrate our access control policies to deal with a different granularities of
data. We will study cases of relative to their usability of the system.
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CHAPTER 5 PREDICTING ONSET OF AUTISM USING SCIENTIFIC
WORKFLOWS
Internet scale data and collaborative research initiatives have opened up new possibil-
ities in health and medical domain. However, this domain intrinsically deals with sensi-
tive data that needs to be carefully managed. Scientific workflows have been a big boon
to tackling complex research questions while fostering collaboration across multiple geo-
graphic locations. In this chapter, we present one such framework that requires processing
of sensitive data, namely therapeutic data in autism spectrum disorder, while providing
repeatability guarantees. This framework, on one hand delineates how scientific workflow
systems like DATAVIEW can be employed to answer complex research questions with re-
peatability guarantees, on the other hand, sets up the motivation to augmenting workflows
and provenance systems with privacy and security protocols.
Early intervention in autism, although deemed as essential, has high variance in the
outcomes attained. The variability in outcome is partly due to a complex interaction be-
tween a multitude of factors and variables involved and lack of principled study to untangle
their influence in the outcome. Therefore, preparing a set of interventions for an individual
child to cater for their need has been uniquely challenging. From the perspective of par-
ents, unknown factors emanate from their unfamiliarity with what interventions are out
there and why; analogously, for caregivers understanding unique attributes of the individ-
ual child develops with time. There is a scarcity of research that explores the interactions
between attributes specific to a child, family characteristics, and therapeutic, medical and
educational services.
In this chapter, we outline a scientific workflow framework that can be employed to
bridge the gap. We show that using DATAVIEW, data mining techniques can be used to
predict manifestation of autism. We used data collected by SFARI [5] dataset.
We frame the problem of understanding phenotypes in autism as a scientific workflow
problem. With that end in view, we propose a workflow that analyzes SFARI dataset for
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understanding phenotypes. We then outline how time-agnostic and windowed-temporal
prediction models can be integrated to sift through features that can explain the data
better.
5.1 Introduction
Recently, we have seen a sudden spike in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) among the
US population. Heterogeneity in data collection and interpretation in treating autism spec-
trum disorder is one of the most fundamental challenges in treating autism and planning
and pragmatic intervention plan. Since hundreds of genes [82] cause manifestation of
autism, several neuro-cognitive mechanisms, variance in phenotypical features also lie in
a broad spectrum. Different areas in this phenotypic spectrum warrant uniquely catered
intervention plan.
Analyzing collective data suggests that early intervention in treating autism spectrum
disorder is highly effective in improving social, adaptive and communication skills. How-
ever, drilling down into the data suggests that individual responses to early intervention is
highly variable with some children responding with substantial improvement, while others
with marginal or no improvement at all. Hence, a blanket statement about the efficacy of
the early intervention on an aggregated level, while true, does little to warrant modifica-
tion to improve its effectiveness on a more individual basis.
The Autism spectrum of disorders, from the standpoint of parents and caregivers, can
sometimes be construed as an enigma. There are potentially numerous reasons why ASD
is deemed somewhat perplexing: lack of data, no clear treatment plan other than Adaptive
Behavior Analysis, lack of fine-grained studies are a few of the salient reasons. A funda-
mental question that parents keep asking experts is how they can add support systems, e.g.,
speech therapy, ABA, and occupational therapy hours and create an appropriate goal/plan
that can help their children make progress. Since the goals that are designed for a child,
not only depend on the behavior the child exhibits, but also varies because of the quality of
the therapy provided, resources available, it has become imperative to aid families come up
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with appropriate set of goals generated from a data-driven standpoint and correcting for
all individual biases. For example, knowing that providing more mainstreamed education
might help a child make progress, irrespective of whether mainstreaming opportunities
are available at the institution, might help parents make an informed decision about their
child’s placement.
We aim to demonstrate the example workflow using information pertaining to pheno-
type data and medical, developmental and educational history data. We also claim that
these data are sensitive in nature and researchers and caregivers should have selective
access to this data. We claim that research that entails processing sensitive data would
flourish more and see better collaboration across industry and geographical location if
scientific workflow platforms inherently provide secure access.
In this study we aim to answer the following questions:
• Provide a scientific workflow framework to facilitate the analysis of autism data and
showcase the workflow as one that processes sensitive data and hence requires data
security protcol.
• Compose a workflow that, based on individual and anonymized data unveils predic-
tive traits of autism.
• Propose a scientific workflow to automate the modeling process and rely on DATAVIEW
to guarantee computational reproducibility and data fidelity.
5.2 Background
Autism, a recent epidemic of a medical condition requires attention from medical, re-
search and behavioral community for analyzing cause and trend and also predicting future
outcomes. It is a neuro-developmental disorder that impairs natural development, causes
challenges in emotional interaction, social communication, sensory processing, etc. It has
a wide range of symptoms that is why this is referred to as Autism Spectrum Disorder
(ASD). In the early 1940’s, the condition was named as “Autism" and “Asperger Syndrome"
82
Figure 34: Overall View of Autism Spectrum Disorder.
by Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger, respectively [62]. Based on the data on National Insti-
tute of Mental Health (NIMH), in the 1970’s the ASD rate was 1 in 10,000. In late 1995
the rate increased up to 1 in 1,000. In 1999 the rate became 1 in 500. In 2001, the rate
was 1 in 250. In 2005, the rate was 1 in 166. By 2007 the rate was revised to 1 in 150. In
2009, the rate rose to 1 in 90 [62]. ASD affects approximately 0.5-0.6% of the population
[19].
This rapid growth in the ASD rate warrants a reason for thinking about environmental
factors and data-driven analysis of causes and symptoms. Due to a proliferation of this
condition, now we have a large pool of data to start analyzing using data mining tech-
niques. Moreover, storage and mining of big data leveraged to handle difficult problems
like this can help understand ASD better.
In the process of promoting research and collecting data, Dr. Bernard Rimland [62]
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founded the Autism Research Institute (ARI) in San Diego, CA in 1967. In their mission,
they try to identify the cause of autism and evaluate treatment efficacy. They have collected
survey data from over 40,000 parents of children with ASD throughout the world [62].
To better understand this epidemic medical condition there are different organization
collecting confidential data from family’s with ASD children. Each year more families
are coming forward to store their data either for the sake of predicting the chances of
siblings having the same condition or with the hope of knowing the cause, as it is still
unknown. The National Database of Autism Research1 has archived the Phenotype data
collected from families and professionals. Based on the available concepts from NDAR, we
have generated a graphical representation for the depiction of the wide range of features
associated with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in Appendix B. Fig. 34 shows very brief
overall graphical representation of the concepts.
5.3 Problem statement
In this research problem, we propose a scientific workflow to analyze phenotype data
and find attributes and relations in these features. We investigate the predictive traits for
autism and showcase the workflow as one that processes sensitive information and hence
requires data access protocol to foster privacy-aware research.
For ASD children, one of the useful intervention methods is ABA (Applied Behavioral
Analysis). Evidence shows that ABA works better than all other behavioral therapy. ABA
data are collected in the form of A-B-C - Antecedent, Behavior, and Consequences. As
most of ASD kids have limited language, A-B-C data gives a good understanding of their
behavior, both problematic and good.
• A. Antecedent Data: It gives a good insight of antecedent of any problem behavior
that triggered the behavior.
• B. Behavior Data: Behavior that is presented by the child.
1https://ndar.nih.gov/
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• C. Consequences: A protocol of good consequence is by which the behavior can be
shaped.
There are several ways to analyze child’s data. One way could be, in our workflow
management system, we can examine childs´ behavioral data to investigate what kind of
educational setting he/she is more compliant to, which mostly predicts the effective envi-
ronment for the child for learning purpose.
5.4 Proposed Work
5.4.1 Predictors of Improvement in Treatment Response
Traits in individual children and fine-grained intervention plans can be viewed as
one of many temporal instances of a bipartite graph, where some of the interactions be-
tween these two groups result in positive outcomes while others result in regression or no
progress. The temporal aspect of the assignmentmeans these interactions and their charac-
teristics alter in terms of efficacy and effectiveness with time. Having a data-driven model
that answers these questions while planning early and subsequent intervention would im-
prove the expected outcome. Many times interventions chosen for a specific child are de-
cided by the availability of services, anecdotal evidence instead of a data-driven decision,
resulting in sub-optimal outcome from the response. Having children enroll in less than
ideal interventions cause the financial burden on the families with little or no noticeable
gain. In this work, we aim to establish a theoretical framework to mine relevant informa-
tion from data to guide intervention plan catered with individuality in mind. Historically,
data collected during interventions can be broken down into several groups:
• Aberrant Behavior Checklist (ABC)
• Adult Behavior Checklist for Ages 19 to 59 (ABCL)
• Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R)
• Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS)
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• Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ)
• Child Behavior Checklist for ages 6 to 18 years (CBCL)
• Repetitive Behavior Scale-Revised (RBS-R)
• Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ-L) - Parent report
• Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ-C) - Teacher report
• Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS)
• Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale-II (VABS-II)
Figure 35: Treatment Improvement Predictor.
5.4.2 Methods
We can model the problem as a classification problem, where we learn the functional
relationship of the behavioral, educational and medical features presented, to the onset of
autism.
So as to understand the influence of time agnostic variables, we can frame the prob-
lem without considering temporal variables in order to identify expected improvement
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in behavior based on features observed in a specific window of time independent of other
timestamps. A by-product of the analysis is an identification of attributes (i.e., intervention
plans and interaction between the trifecta as stated above) that lead to a better response to
a specific intervention plan. Many classification algorithms can be employed, i.e., logistic
regression. With proper regularization, logistic regression analysis can also provide signif-
icance of individual features and hence can guide what interventions to pay attention to.
We can also employ other non-linear classification techniques like random forest or sup-
port vector machines, i.e., SVM. The Random forest operates on an ensemble of decision
trees at training time and at inference time predicts the class that is the mode of the classes
of all the constituent trees. The random forest can counter overfitting problem as observed
in decision trees. On the other hand, SVM learns a hyperplane in a high dimensional space
that separates the classes in question. Among a set of feasible hyperplanes, the one that
is chosen has the largest distance from the support vectors. Since, non-linear classification
are more expressive in nature, in this chapter, we chose to explore decision trees and SVMs
that support those relation. However, the notion of dependence in the time window is not
explicitly modeled in this case and we model the problem by collapsing multiple windows
into a single input frame.
DATAVIEW supports non-linear classifiers e.g. Random forest and Support vector ma-
chine. We have used DATAVIEW to employ these non-linear classification techniques.
5.4.3 Modeling Scientific Workflow
We propose to structure the entire learning problem as a scientific workflow and intro-
duce a strategy to guarantee reproducibility and data fidelity. Hence, the workflow can be
deemed as portable and can be retrained and reused in isolation, for example, for different
age groups.
After the data are collected, the entire process is modeled as a scientific workflow.
Validation of the method is done based on standard techniques, i.e., label-wise precision-
recall.
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Table 8: Factors Involved for Predicting Treatment Outcomes.
ASD child predictable ASD child given Family Features f Intervention Plan i
features c1 features c2
Denial Tolerance/time unit Age Father’s education level Hours of ABA/week
Elopement/time unit Weight Mother’s education level Speech/week
Listener Response/ time unit IQ Father’s IQ level Behavior Intervention
Plan
Mand/time unit Food Habit Mother’s IQ level Nutrition supplements/
week
MLU/time unit Geographic Family History of ASD
location from Father’s side
Throwing/time unit Family History of ASD
from Mother’s side
Hitting/time unit Family stress level
Dropping/time unit Family’s positive involvement
Self InjuriousBehavior/time unit Social support
Property Destruction/time unit Family’s expectation about
treatment
Table 9: Feature Prediction Based on Timestamp.
Timestamp 1 Timestamp 2 Timestamp 3 Timestamp 4
c1 c2 c1 c2 c1 c2 ? c2
F F F F
I I I I
Modeling it as a time-agnostic classification problem requires deciding on predefined
window size, in the example, it is 4. The features of the window are fed into the algorithm
and the outcome modeled as a function of the features.
5.5 Implementation and Experiments
5.5.1 DATAVIEW: A Big Data Workflow Management System
DATAVIEW is a big data workflow management system [77], that shows the feasibility
of learning computational thinking in perspective of scientific workflow. We have used this
workflow management system to implement the data mining techniques for predicting the
outcome of the intervention technique based on the features available. The main reason
of using DATAVIEW is to give flexibility to the researcher of Autism Community and also
parents and caregiver not to deal with any underlying complexity of computation and can
predict or correlate between features based on given train dataset.
This also gives us a platform for working on big data. As more researchers, with
their heterogeneous data sources, collaborate in this domain, the data size is likely to
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Figure 36: Running Workflow Predicting Classes on Data Mining Technique.
grow. Hence, for scalability and collaboration purposes, portable scientific workflow like
DATAVIEW is an obvious choice.
The DATAVIEW has many primitive workflows, called built-in workflows. After the
developers establish primitive construct, it is comparatively effortless and convenient to
built executable workflows. For each built-in or primitive workflows used, needed only the
required number of inputs and output.
Moreover, for providing more flexibility to the users, the current DATAVIEW has inte-
grated Dropbox feature, so that users can offer any big data file and computation tools
to analyze those data and drag-drop the built-in construct provided by DATAVIEW team
and saved the result in an output which also can be accessed in a Dropbox folder. In this
way, end users do not have to deal with the underlying complexity and can quickly obtain
results.
In Fig. 39, shows one example of our executable workflow for predicting classes based
on Random Forest data mining technique.
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5.5.2 SFARI Dataset
We collaborated with SFARI (Simons Foundation Autism Research Initiative) [5] re-
search and gathered a wide range of data which are collected over a period. Here SFARI
gathered raw data of 440 families where a number of individual with diagnosis is 1050.
The total size of the gathered dataset is 95MB. For our scientific workflow system, we
explore “SSC_Version_15_Phenotype_Data_Set" and “SSCIAN_Follow_Up_Study_Dataset"
dataset from SFARI.
In this follow-up study participants have completed a variety of measures which in-
cludes updated medical, educational histories and developmental updates based on stan-
dardized questionnaires.
Based upon the raw data collected, we have chosen 3 sets of Phenotype and their follow
up data. Those are:
• FollowUpMedTbl: uses SFARI dataset “ssc_follow_up_medications",
• FollowUpEduTbl: uses SFARI dataset “ssc_follow_up_eduhx_child" and
• FollowUpFamHisTbl: uses SFARI dataset “ssc_follow_up_family_history".
In Table. 10, we can see the attribute set selected for each table from three different
contexts. These are all Proband data which means ASD diagnosed person.
In FollowUpMedTble, some of the salient attributes are sscmedcodevalue, symptomsta-
tus, type were based on the medications given, we can see the symptom status of the
proband, i.e., symptoms worsened, No change in symptoms, symptoms have improved for
past, current or current other.
In FollowUpEduTbl, we can see the following: which school type they are in, i.e.,
Special Ed or General ed or combination of both; what is their grade level; what kind of
services they are getting; how is the classroom setting; do they have any personal aide;
information about the siblings; and are siblings also receiving intervention services or
special ed services.
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Table 10: Selected Features Based on Each Dataset.
FollowUpMedTbl FollowUpEduTbl FollowUpFamHisTbl
sfari_id sfari_id sfari_id
multiplex multiplex multiplex
lost_diagnosis lost_diagnosis lost_diagnosis
sex sex sex
role role role
Fcode Fcode Fcode
sscmedFcodedvalue school_type relationship
Ftype grade_level yearofbirth
symptomstatus special_ed_services gender
age_at_eval special_ed_Fcode ASD
measure_Fcode classroom_setting scd
measure_Ftype_revision personal_aide language
study siblings_intervention_services phonological
siblings_special_ed_services developmental
age_at_eval learning
measure_Fcode intellectual
measure_Ftype_revision epilepsy
study ADHD
OCD
anxiety
depression
bipolar
scizophrenia
other
age_at_eval
measure_Fcode
measure_Ftype_revision
study
In FollowUpFamHisTbl, we have all the information about their age, what kind of chal-
lenges they are facing. ASD is a combination of challenges. When we look into those
attributes we can see the challenges can be any one of the following: language, phonolog-
ical, developmental, learning, intellectual, epilepsy, adhd, ocd, anxiety, depression, bipolar,
schizophrenia, or other.
After getting all the information from 3 different context and joining all the information,
we have a complete set of finding for one individual. We analyze this complete set of data
using 2 data mining algorithms and run that in DATAVIEW.
5.5.3 Running Random Forest Algorithm in DATAVIEW
We used Random Forest as our prediction method. Random Forest, an ensemble learn-
ing method for classification, regression, and other tasks by composes and combines a
multitude of decision trees at training time and uses a majority vote to infer the output at
prediction time. For Random Forest, we didn’t restrict the maximum depth parameter and
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set bag size percent to be 80%.
To run Random Forest algorithm in DATAVIEW, we use DATAVIEWs´ primitive work-
flows, “FilterNull", “SelectFields", “ImputeMissingValue" and “NaturalJoin". We filter out
all the rows with null values using “FilterNull" p-workflow. Then use “SelectFields" to se-
lect only those fields where maximum string size is less than 50. Then we impute missing
value with 0 in “ImputeMissingValue" p-workflow. We join Education History and Medical
History first, then use another “NaturalJoin" primitive workflow to join individual’s Family
history too.
Now we use our primitive Random Forest workflow named “rf" which run the data
mining algorithm, Random Forest. It has 3 input port and 1 output port. Input ports are
training set, test set and the number of trees we would like to generate. The final join
output works as an input for the training set. For test set, we can label any attribute we
want to predict. The output port will return the correct label of the test set.
In Fig. 37 shows the example of our executable workflow for predicting classes based
on Random Forest data mining technique.
For this experiment we predict, the symptom status of proband based on the training
data. We show our prediction accuracy based on PR curve in Fig. 38. Here the precision-
recall curve is plotted for the class “Symptoms improved". We observe similar performance
for the other classes as well.
For validation purposes, we split the data 70%-30% and used the smaller data pool as
a validation set.
5.5.4 Running Support Vector Machine Algorithm in DATAVIEW
We run the same experiment using Support Vector Machine. For SVM, we use the
polynomial kernel with an exponent of 1.
We have used same 3 datasets and our primitive workflows, “FilterNull", “SelectFields",
“ImputeMissingValue" and “NaturalJoin". After doing preprocessing on datasets we join
them, FollowUpEduTbl, FollowUpFamHisTbl, and FollowUpMedTble. We use the final
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Figure 37: RF Workflow in DATAVIEW.
Figure 38: PR Curve Based on Random Forest.
table as our training dataset for SVM algorithm. Here also we predict proband’s symptom
status based on the training set.
Our PR curve for “Symptoms improved" class depicts the prediction accuracy of our
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algorithm.
Figure 39: SVM Workflow in DATAVIEW.
Figure 40: PR Curve Based for Support Vector Machine.
In a comparison of both Random Forest and Support Vector Machine, Random Forest
inherently models the nonlinearity of the data and is relatively straightforward to counter
for overfitting. In SVM, the appropriate kernel needs to be chosen to model non-linearity
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in the data. Because of the nature of the data, we did not see a significant advantage of
using one over the other, in this case.
5.6 Sensitivity of Data
This workflow demonstrates how scientific workflows can be used to process sensitive
data to answer research questions. However, it is evident that these datasets require special
handling and managing on access privileges. In autism research community physicians,
scientist, teachers, psychologists can be involved. However, all the contributors should
not be granted unrestricted access to all the datasets. The data needs to be partitioned,
and access permission to specific dataset should be made to the responsible contributor.
If the underlying scientific workflow and the provenance system does not provide support
for such access control protocol, research collaboration will fail to flourish as data access
compliance as mandated by HIPPA, for example, will have been violated.
5.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we demonstrated amalgamation between Autism Health informatics
community and Workflow community. This research is motivated by augmenting health
informatics into scientific workflows to guarantee data reproducibility.
This can be extended in the following major research directions.
• To identify variables that are involved and the most likely set of variables to have trig-
gered the incident, for each individual episode of manifestation of problem behavior,
based on ASD data.
• To recommend the next set of goals that are appropriate and beneficial, based on the
trend of data.
• To develop tools of built-in construct for facilitating analysis of big data in DATAVIEW
platform.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our research focuses on secure data-intensive computation and scalable querying and
analysis. Our main contributions are:
• In this dissertation research, we propose OPQLPig, a parallel, robust, reliable and
scalable translation of OPQL to Pig Latin programs for supporting the W3C PROV-DM
standard provenance model. We propose algorithms to translate OPQL constructs to
equivalent Pig Latin programs and develop and evaluate our OPQLPig solution on
provenance datasets from the UTPB benchmark. We then create some visual OPQL
constructs in the DATAVIEW big data workflow system to facilitate the simple creation
of complex OPQL queries in a visual workflow style.
• Next, for secure analysis and demonstration of health informatics data, we propose
a secure scientific workflow specification with role-based access control policy and
demonstrate how the workflow provenance system inherits those policies. We char-
acterize the desirable properties of role-based access control protocol in scientific
workflows and delineate how the properties are maintained in the workflow prove-
nance systems as well. We proposed formal secure scientific workflow specification
and algorithms and access control policies, analyze those policies in perspective of
policy quality requirements to find out these evolving policies are up-to-date, com-
plete, relevant and free of inconsistencies. We validated the quality of access control
policies for provenance.
• Lastly, for automated computation-intensive and data-intensive analysis of big data,
we have chosen Autism domain. Analyzing and mining big data, we use DATAVIEW
to provide a platform for identifying the factors for success, antecedents for behavior
and positive outcome based on collected data in the domain of autism. Analyzing
collective data suggests that early intervention in treating autism spectrum disorder
is highly effective in improving social, adaptive and communication skills.
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As a future direction I plan to investigate the following research issues:
• To extend our OPQLPig query language and conduct the experimental study based
on current system and NoSQL Database like HBase or Cassandra; and applicable for
other queries such as sub-graph isomorphism, pattern matching, and shortest path.
• To conduct security case studies with more complex data patterns and integrate our
access control policies to deal with a different granularity of data and study cases of
usability of the system.
• To recommend next set of goals that are appropriate and beneficial for ASD children,
based on the trend of data and develop built-in analysis tools in DATAVIEW platform.
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APPENDIX A
DATAVIEW is a big data workflow management system. DATAVIEW consists of 4 major
parts consists of different modules in each part: Presentation Layer, Workflow Manage-
ment Layer, Task Management Layer and Infrastructure Layer. The presentation layer is
responsible for the design of scientific workflows, the presentation of data product and
data provenance information, as well as the system status. The workflow design and con-
figuration module provide intuitive GUI for users to design and configure workflows. The
workflow engine is the central module that controls the execution of workflows. This mod-
ule allows the users to drag and drop existing workflows and compose them with workflow
constructs to formalize new composite workflows. The presentation layer automatically
translates the graphical composition into a workflow definition file, and then send it to the
workflow engine to register the new workflow. The workflow monitor module keeps track
of the status of individual components, i.e.,"initialized", "executing", "finished", and "error".
This layer allows users to create workflows and to browse, search, manage, execute, and
reuse existing workflows. The data product manager module stores all data products used
in workflows. This module allows users to create data products, and to browse, search,
manage, and use existing data products. The provenance manager module is responsi-
ble for storing, browsing, and querying workflow provenance. The task manager module
enables the execution of heterogeneous atomic tasks such as Web services and scripts.
The infrastructure layer plays a key role in provisioning, cataloging, configuring, and
terminating virtual resources in clouds and data centers. Using DATAVIEW, a user not only
easily share data and workflows with peer collaborators, but also design and run big data
scientific workflows in the cloud, which includes commercial Amazon EC2 and academic
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FutureSystems.
The workflow design and configuration module interact with Provenance Collector,
which gathers provenance data. In particular, every time when a workflow design specifi-
cation updated or saved, Provenance Collector translates the specification into a prospec-
tive provenance and stores that data into a provenance store which is in provenance man-
ager. Provenance manager provides the functionality of provenance visualization via user-
friendly GUIs, data insertion and provenance querying.
Figure 41: DATAVIEW: A big data scientific workflow management tool.
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APPENDIX B
Figure 42: Autism Spectrum Disorder Personal Traits
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Figure 43: Autism Spectrum Disorder Social Competence
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Figure 44: Autism Spectrum Disorder Medical History
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In the era of big data, scientific workflows have become essential to automate scien-
tific experiments and guarantee repeatability. As both data and workflow increase in their
scale, requirements for having a data lineage management system commensurate with
the complexity of the workflow also become necessary, calling for new scalable storage,
query, and analytics infrastructure. This system that manages and preserves the derivation
history and morphosis of data, known as provenance system, is essential for maintain-
ing quality and trustworthiness of data products and ensuring reproducibility of scientific
discoveries. With a flurry of research and increased adoption of scientific workflows in
processing sensitive data, i.e., health and medication domain, securing information flow
and instrumenting access privileges in the system have become a fundamental precursor
to deploying large-scale scientific workflows. That has become more important now since
today team of scientists around the world can collaborate on experiments using globally
distributed sensitive data sources. Hence, it has become imperative to augment scientific
workflow systems as well as the underlying provenance management systems with data
security protocols. Provenance systems, void of data security protocol, are susceptible
to vulnerability. In this dissertation research, we delineate how scientific workflows can
improve therapeutic practices in autism spectrum disorders. Showcasing scientific explo-
ration in the domain of autism spectrum disorder demonstrates the need for privacy-aware
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scientific workflows and provenance systems. We also aim to underscore the significance
of data driven analysis of therapeutic studies for children on the spectrum. The data-
intensive computation inherent in these workflows and sensitive nature of the data, ne-
cessitate support for scalable, parallel and robust provenance queries and secured view
of data. With that in perspective, we propose OPQLPig, a parallel, robust, reliable and
scalable provenance query language and introduce the concept of access privilege inheri-
tance in the provenance systems. We characterize desirable properties of role-based access
control protocol in scientific workflows and demonstrate how the qualities are integrated
into the workflow provenance systems as well. Finally, we describe how these concepts fit
within the DATAVIEW workflow management system.
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